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BANKRUPTCY ON THE SIDE 
Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, 
& David A. Skeel, Jr. 
ABSTRACT—This Article provides a framework for analyzing side 
agreements among stakeholders in corporate bankruptcy, such as 
intercreditor and “bad boy” agreements. These agreements are 
controversial because they commonly include a promise by a stakeholder to 
remain silent—to waive some procedural right they would otherwise have 
under the Bankruptcy Code—at potentially crucial points in the 
reorganization process. 
Using simplified examples, we show that side agreements create 
benefits in some instances. But, in other cases, parties to a side agreement 
may attempt to extract value from nonparties to the agreement by 
contracting for specific performance or excessive stipulated damages that 
impose negative externalities on those nonparties. By using more extreme 
(and inefficient) remedies, the parties to the agreement can commit 
themselves to charging more to nonparties who—seeking to avoid the 
externalities—pay them to breach the agreement. While this can be 
profitable for the parties to the agreement, it can also lower the collective 
value of the estate for all stakeholders. 
We develop a proposal that not only preserves the efficiency benefits 
of side agreements but also limits negative externalities and opportunities 
to extract value from nonparties. Where a nontrivial potential for value-
destroying externalities exists, the court should enforce the agreements but 
limit the remedies for breach to expectation damages. Our proposal is 
superior to the current approach in the case law, which focuses on tougher 
contract interpretation standards instead of limitations on remedies. 
We also use our model to determine whether intercreditor agreement 
disputes should be resolved by the bankruptcy court or by other courts. If 
the nonbreaching party asks for expectation damages, the bankruptcy court 
has no particular expertise and should defer to forum selection clauses. 
Where the nonbreaching party seeks specific performance or stipulated 
damages, by contrast, our model suggests that the dispute should be 
resolved exclusively in bankruptcy proceedings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code was designed to resolve coordination problems 
that arise when multiple creditors hold claims against a common debtor.1 In 
broad terms, the Bankruptcy Code tries to strike a balance between 
respecting the individual rights held by creditors and limiting the negative 
impact of the exercise of those rights on the value of the company’s assets 
as a whole.2 Bankruptcy adds the most value when creditors and other 
stakeholders are dispersed and uncoordinated, making bargaining outside 
bankruptcy costly or impossible. To encourage coordination toward 
reaching a value-maximizing outcome in those cases, the law suspends 
creditors’ individual collection efforts and creates a structured bargaining 
process.3 
Resolving coordination problems while respecting individual rights is 
a challenging task, even in garden-variety cases. But recent developments 
in the financing structure of firms have added additional layers of 
complexity to the problem. In a spate of recent cases, bankruptcy judges 
have been asked to resolve disputes regarding side agreements between two 
or more stakeholders who form a subset of the overall stakeholder body.4 A 
common example of such a side agreement is an intercreditor agreement, 
whereby two creditor groups, and sometimes the debtor, agree on how to 
allocate cash flow and control rights between the parties to the agreement 
when a bankruptcy occurs.5 Outcomes in large corporate reorganization 
cases—not only the division of value but also what happens to the 
company itself—can turn on the judge’s interpretation and enforcement of 
such a side agreement as well as on the secondary and tertiary deals 
arranged by one or more of the parties to work around that original side 
agreement. Disputes about the side agreement or the subsequent 
 
 1 Even over a century ago, lawmakers recognized that if creditors were left to their state law 
collection remedies, they might “race to the courthouse,” potentially destroying the going concern value 
of an otherwise viable firm. Bankruptcy’s role in solving this coordination problem is the focus of the 
principal normative theory of bankruptcy, the “creditors’ bargain” model. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10–11 (1986). 
 2 For example, although secured creditors are not permitted to foreclose on their collateral (because 
the collateral may be needed for a reorganization or other resolution of the debtor’s financial distress), 
the Bankruptcy Code does require “adequate protection” of secured creditors’ interests. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(d)(1) (2012). 
 3 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (imposing a stay on collection activities). 
 4 See, for example, the cases discussed infra Part V. 
 5 For a practitioner-oriented discussion of intercreditor agreements and the issues they raise in 
bankruptcy, see Jeffrey A. Marks, Bankruptcy Issues in Intercreditor Agreements, SQUIRE PATTON 
BOGGS (May 31, 2009), http://www.squirepattonboggs.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/ 
2009/05/bankruptcy-issues-in-intercreditor-agreements/files/intercreditor_agreements_2009/ 
fileattachment/intercreditor_agreements_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8N9-5UW2]. 
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workaround arrangements—which we will call “defections”—have become 
one of the most important controversies in an increasing number of recent 
cases.6 
A common theme in these disputes is the allegation that one of the 
parties to the side agreement breached a promise to be “silent” in some 
way, by asserting a right or taking an action that would otherwise be 
permissible under the Bankruptcy Code, but is prohibited by the agreement. 
Often, the dispute involves allegations by one of the parties to the side 
agreement (the promisee) that the other party (the promisor) has struck a 
new deal with another stakeholder to defect from the side agreement. 
Because the promisee alleges that this defection breaches the side 
agreement, the promisee then seeks to enjoin the defection. Thus, while the 
parties purportedly write these agreements to encourage coordination and 
limit unnecessary litigation, they are often invoked to shut down new 
coordination efforts. 
The recent Momentive case provides an example of the kinds of side 
agreements and defections that can arise.7 Momentive Performance 
Materials (Momentive), a silicone and quartz manufacturer that had been 
acquired by a private equity fund in 2006, entered bankruptcy with a capital 
structure that included first- and second-lien secured debt, and other 
categories of unsecured debt.8 Prior to bankruptcy, the first- and second-
lien creditors signed an intercreditor agreement that restricted the ability of 
the second-lien note creditors to enforce certain rights that would have been 
available to them as secured creditors.9 After Momentive filed for 
bankruptcy, the second-lien creditors reached a deal to defect with the 
debtors (called a restructuring support agreement) that would reorganize 
the company and give the stock of the reorganized Momentive to the 
 
 6 See, e.g., In re Musicland Holding Corp., 386 B.R. 428, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the 
unambiguous language of the intercreditor agreement must be followed despite the subordinated 
creditors having a different understanding of its terms), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2009); In re TCI 
2 Holdings, LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 141 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (holding, in a case involving competing 
plans of reorganization, that the court did not need to determine whether the second lien holders’ plan 
violated the side agreement because, even with a violation, confirmation would not be impeded); In re 
Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 5 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (early case addressing the enforceability of 
intercreditor agreements under Bankruptcy Code § 510(a), holding that there is no indication that 
Congress intended to allow creditors to alter, through subordination agreements, bankruptcy provisions 
unrelated to asset distribution). 
 7 See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). We discuss the Momentive 
controversy in detail in Parts II.B and IV, infra. 
 8 In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. 321, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev'd in part, 
No. 15-1682, 2017 WL 4772248 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2017). 
 9 MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 751.  
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second-lien creditors.10 The second-lien creditors also supported actions the 
debtor took and arguments the debtor made to reduce the value that the 
first-lien creditors would receive.11 The first-lien creditors sued the second-
lien creditors in state court for violating the intercreditor agreement, but the 
litigation was removed to the bankruptcy court and decided after the plan 
was confirmed.12 The court decided in favor of the second-lien creditors. In 
part, the judge reached this decision because he concluded that the 
ambiguous language of the intercreditor agreement should be read in favor 
of preserving second-lien creditors’ bankruptcy rights.13 According to the 
judge, it was not “clear beyond peradventure” that the second-lien creditors 
had waived their rights in the agreement.14 
In the RadioShack case,15 a bankruptcy judge took a notably different 
approach. The electronics retailer entered bankruptcy with two groups of 
secured creditors and an intercreditor agreement defining the rights of the 
two groups.16 Adding to the complexity, the creditors within each secured 
lender group divided themselves into classes via separate side agreements 
(called agreements among lenders, or AALs).17 In one of the AALs, the 
party in a junior priority position, the hedge fund Salus Capital Partners, 
was prohibited from objecting to any sale that the senior priority creditors, 
including the hedge fund Cerberus Capital Management, agreed to.18 When 
Salus raised an objection to a motion by RadioShack to sell its assets, 
Cerberus invoked the AAL to argue that Salus had no standing to object 
because Cerberus favored the sale.19 In this case, the judge specifically 
enforced the agreement to deny standing to Salus because the AAL 
prohibited the objection.20 
 
 10 Id. at 746. 
 11 Id. (describing the alleged breaches of the intercreditor agreement). 
 12 See Order Denying Remand Motion, BOKF, N.A. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-08247 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014). 
 13 See MPM Silicones, 518 B.R at 750. 
 14 Id. (quoting In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 15 In re RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
 16 See id. at 704–07; Transcript of Hearing at 19, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 
(No. 15-10197) (March 30, 2015); Sarah R. Borders et al., Client Alert: Recent Unitranche Issues in the 
RadioShack Bankruptcy Case 1, KING & SPALDING (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/recent-unitranche-issues-in-the-87848/ [https://perma.cc/J92M-
KGF9]. 
 17 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 5; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 1. 
 18 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 62–63; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2. 
 19 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 63; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2. 
 20 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 63–64. Even in RadioShack, the court did not 
consistently enforce intercreditor agreements. The court did not resolve a related dispute under the other 
AAL, which had the effect of declining to enforce that agreement. RadioShack is discussed in more 
detail in Section I.C and Section IV.C., infra. 
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Disputes like these raise a host of questions that have not yet been 
consistently or coherently resolved. Should a side agreement be treated like 
any other contract? When a party agrees to waive a right it would otherwise 
have in bankruptcy, should the waiver be enforceable? Should courts 
interpret ambiguously drafted terms against the party seeking to get around 
the Bankruptcy Code? If the waiver of the right is enforceable, what 
remedies should be available—should the right be specifically enforceable, 
as in RadioShack, or enforceable with damages, as was sought in 
Momentive? And procedurally, should these disputes be adjudicated inside 
or outside the bankruptcy courts? 
This Article provides a framework for thinking about these questions. 
Using simplified examples, we demonstrate the beneficial and harmful 
potential of side agreements. We will focus on intercreditor agreements 
involving a senior creditor and a junior creditor, but the basic principles are 
general enough to apply to side agreements involving other subsets of 
stakeholders as well. In a so-called “bad boy” agreement, for instance, a 
debtor agrees with a subset of creditors not to file for bankruptcy.21 Another 
example is special purpose securitization vehicles, whose organizational 
documents keep some creditors silent by restricting their ability to 
negotiate with the debtor.22 
On the benefit side, we show that side agreements can provide 
effective workarounds for some of the inefficient mandatory terms in the 
Bankruptcy Code, as well as solve problems caused by the inherent 
incompleteness of contracts. A side agreement can limit the ability of a 
party to use a bankruptcy right opportunistically against its counterparty, 
where the benefit to exercising a right for one party reduces value to the 
side agreement coalition as a whole. To give a concrete example, a second-
lien creditor might agree not to raise any objections that—although allowed 
under the Bankruptcy Code—would stall a value-maximizing sale process. 
On the cost side, however, we show that side agreements will not 
always maximize the value for all stakeholders. The parties to a side 
agreement will only maximize their joint value; they will not take into 
account the effect of their agreement on the company’s other stakeholders. 
And they may even use side agreements to impose negative effects on 
those outside stakeholders in an attempt to extract value from them. We 
 
 21 See, e.g., David Djaha et al., Protect Yourself from the ‘Bad Boys’, N.Y. L. J., (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202566826929/Protect-Yourself-From-the-Bad-Boys 
[https://perma.cc/J9Q5-NSRC] (discussing the use of bad boy agreements). 
 22 See, e.g., In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the defendants violated a side agreement prohibiting them from directly negotiating with 
creditors). 
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show that such extraction attempts can result in parties contracting for 
specific performance of a right, or excessive stipulated damages, when 
expectation damages would be preferred from an overall efficiency 
standpoint. These side agreements, though profitable for the parties to the 
agreement, can shut down opportunities in the bankruptcy proceeding for 
one or more parties to strike efficiency-enhancing deals to defect. This in 
turn lowers the expected value that can be recovered through the 
bankruptcy process and increases the ex ante cost of finance for debtors.23 
In light of the potential problems associated with enforcing side 
agreements as written, we develop a simple proposal that honors the intent 
of the parties to the side agreement and preserves the efficiency benefits 
they create, while limiting the negative consequences. We propose the 
following: if a side agreement is unlikely to cause value-destroying 
externalities,24 a court should enforce the agreement according to its terms, 
including stipulated damage clauses or specific performance requirements. 
But if there is a nontrivial potential for value-destroying externalities, the 
court should limit a nonbreaching party’s remedy to its expectation 
damages. 
The above solution implies that, where there is a nontrivial possibility 
of externalities, a court should hear an objection or allow an action that 
would otherwise be permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, even if the 
parties’ intercreditor agreement prohibits it. The court should not block 
defections that violate an intercreditor agreement unless they otherwise 
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. Expectation damages for breach should 
be payable to the nonbreaching party, but the court can decide these 
damages independently from, and later than, the objection itself. 
The efficiency benefits of expectation damages are well understood in 
the literature on contracts: when properly calculated, they force the 
promisor to internalize the costs imposed on the promisee.25 Although our 
proposal to apply similar logic to intercreditor agreements in bankruptcy 
may seem novel—and it is quite different than the approach that appears to 
be emerging in the case law—bankruptcy law uses precisely the same 
strategy when dealing with other related issues. Outside of bankruptcy, for 
 
 23 The general law-and-economics view of bankruptcy worries about the ex ante cost of finance. 
Bankruptcy rules that reduce the total ex post value of a bankruptcy estate create problems because they 
increase the cost of ex ante financing. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 
108 YALE L.J. 573, 579–80 (1998). 
 24 Value-destroying externalities occur when enforcing the side agreement negatively affects the 
recovery of a stakeholder who is outside the side agreement. 
 25 See, e.g., Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the 
Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (summarizing recent debate and defending the 
traditional view). 
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instance, a secured creditor has the right to seize its collateral when the 
debtor defaults.26 Inside bankruptcy, the mandatory automatic stay prevents 
collateral seizure, and the secured creditor is promised “adequate 
protection” payments if the collateral begins to lose value.27 This is justified 
on the ground that when bargaining among all creditors is not possible, the 
debtor and the secured creditor do not internalize the effects of seizure on 
the other creditors. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code replaces a specific 
performance right (the right to seize collateral) with damages (adequate 
protection payments), unless the risk that the seizure will affect the other 
creditors is negligible.28 A side agreement usually does not threaten to 
remove a key asset, but it may remove a key party (the silent creditor) from 
negotiations, which can have similar negative effects on third-party 
stakeholders. 
In the bankruptcy setting, we show that fully enforced expectation 
damages (ED) invite efficient, value-creating defections, provided that: (a) 
the promisor in the side agreement and the third party can negotiate 
efficiently—that is, they reach a deal to defect whenever it increases their 
joint payoff; and (b) the third party’s interests are aligned with the parties 
outside the side agreement. These conditions will not hold in all 
circumstances, so ED is not a panacea for all coordination problems in 
bankruptcy; but, importantly, we show that—given the specific dynamics 
of bankruptcy procedure—the costs of ED’s imperfections are likely to be 
lower than the costs of specific performance and stipulated damages.29 
Throughout the discussion, we consider the controversies over side 
agreements and defections that lie at the heart of a series of prominent 
recent cases. Although courts have not yet developed a settled approach to 
these issues, they are increasingly trying to regulate these arrangements by 
narrowly construing the contractual language and only enforcing language 
that is “clear beyond peradventure.”30 Our model suggests that this 
 
 26 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-609, 9-610 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (setting forth 
state law remedies of foreclosure and sale of collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code).  
 27 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012). As another example, plans of reorganization can be “crammed 
down” even when classes of creditors dissent, replacing the right to veto a plan with judicially valued 
compensation in the form of new securities. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). 
 28 For discussion of the liquidity-enhancing benefits of these rules, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. 
Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557 (2013); George G. Triantis, 
Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2000). Section 
362(d)(2) requires that the judge lift the stay if the debtor: (a) has no equity in the collateral; and (b) the 
collateral is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). When both of these 
conditions hold, the effect of collateral seizure on third party creditors is small, and hence, the specific 
performance right of the secured creditor is honored. 
 29 See infra Section III.A. 
 30 In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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approach is a mistake and that it could have serious unintended 
consequences. The parties, desiring an enforceable but narrow side 
agreement, may be compelled to draft something broader or all-
encompassing to get courts to specifically enforce the agreement. This 
could result in the paradoxical outcome that courts do not enforce narrowly 
tailored efficient side agreements but fully enforce (with specific 
performance) broad side agreements that create serious externalities. Our 
model suggests that courts should focus primarily on the remedy, rather 
than on the scope of the contractual language. 
Our model also provides a simple framework for resolving the 
increasingly vexing questions of whether intercreditor agreement disputes 
should be resolved by the bankruptcy court or outside bankruptcy, and 
whether forum selection clauses should be enforced. If the nonbreaching 
party asks for expectation damages, the bankruptcy court has no particular 
expertise and should defer to forum clauses that call for a different forum. 
Where specific performance or stipulated damages are at issue, by contrast, 
our model suggests that the dispute should be resolved exclusively in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
We are not the first to consider the issues surrounding intercreditor 
agreements and propose recommendations. In a recent paper, Edward 
Morrison argues, as we do, that enforcement of intercreditor agreements 
should turn on the presence or absence of externalities.31 He identifies rules 
of thumb judges can use to guide decisions on enforcement and potential 
actions (such as vote assignment), in which externalities are more or less 
likely to be present.32 Our analysis adds to this understanding of side 
agreements in three ways. First, our theory analyzes the potential for deals 
that defect from side agreements, an important phenomenon in many 
recent, prominent Chapter 11 cases. Second, we analyze the incentives of 
parties to side agreements at the drafting stage—including incentives to 
extract value from nonparties—in order to better understand why 
externalities might exist in the first place. Third, we generate several new 
proposals that can guide judicial enforcement of side agreements and 
defections from those agreements and address the complicated 
jurisdictional questions that have arisen. 
The Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, we summarize some of 
the recent prominent cases involving intercreditor agreements and note the 
common themes in these cases. In Part II, we present our theoretical 
 
 31 Edward R. Morrison, Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 721. 
 32 See id. at 730–33 (describing courts’ ability to delay making a decision on an intercreditor 
agreement as a key rule of thumb); id. at 732 (discussing the risk of externalities with vote assignment 
provisions). 
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framework, which uses a series of simple numerical examples to generate 
intuitions about the costs and benefits of enforcing intercreditor 
agreements. In Part III, we discuss normative implications of the theory 
and, in Part IV, we apply the theory to recent cases including those 
discussed in Part I. Part V provides additional analysis of expectation 
damages before briefly concluding. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Subordination agreements, which subordinate the claims of one 
creditor to those of another, have been a familiar feature of bankruptcy for 
decades. The Bankruptcy Code explicitly endorses these arrangements, 
stating that a subordination agreement “is enforceable in a case under this 
title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”33 Because many intercreditor agreements do more 
than simply subordinate second-lien creditors, however, courts cannot point 
to the Bankruptcy Code’s prosubordination agreement policy as resolving 
the senior and junior creditors’ disputes over the intercreditor agreement. 
They must determine whether the agreement covers the dispute in question, 
and if it does, whether the term in question is permissible. 
Bankruptcy courts’ handling of these disputes has been quite 
inconsistent. On one extreme, some courts have flat-out refused to enforce 
provisions that seem to interfere with the Chapter 11 negotiating and voting 
process. In In re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership,34 for instance, the 
court invalidated a provision that transferred a junior creditor’s voting 
rights to the senior creditor.35 On the other extreme, some courts have fully 
enforced these provisions.36 In the middle are cases where the courts have 
been less straightforward, paying lip service to enforcement while 
nonetheless finding ways to conclude that an enforcing senior creditor (the 
promisee) is not entitled to relief. 37 Finally, we suspect that some courts are 
 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012). 
 34 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 35 See also In re SW Hotel Venture, LLC 460 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, sub nom. In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 479 B.R. 210 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012) (also refusing 
to enforce a vote assignment provision), vacated, 748 F.3d 393 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 36 See, e.g., In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 362 B.R. 43 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (enforcing vote 
assignment). 
 37 Morrison divides the intercreditor agreement cases into three categories: those that refuse to 
enforce the agreements because they are inequitable or otherwise interfere with the bankruptcy process, 
those that enforce the agreements, and those that “take[] the middle road.” Morrison, supra note 31, at 
725. In the middle-road cases, courts purport to enforce provisions that require the promisor to stay 
silent in the case but nevertheless consider the merits of the promisor’s motion or objection. Id. at 723–
25 (citing, among others, In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 316–17 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
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just reaching pragmatic outcomes regardless of the provisions in the side 
agreements.38 
In the discussion that follows, we try to make sense of three leading 
recent cases: In re Boston Generating, LLC (Boston Generating),39 In re 
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive),40 and In re RadioShack Corp 
(RadioShack).41 Although the cases continue to reach divergent outcomes, 
several recurring themes seem to be emerging. 
A. The Boston Generating Approach: “Clear Beyond Peradventure” 
The decision in Boston Generating has set the tone for courts’ recent 
handling of disputes over the implications of intercreditor agreements. 
Boston Generating was a wholesale electricity provider in Boston and its 
environs, with the third largest generation operations in New England.42 For 
eighteen months before its August 18, 2010 bankruptcy filing, the debtors 
sought to find a buyer for most or all of their assets.43 After initially 
contacting 199 potential buyers, Boston Generating winnowed the potential 
bidders down to 6, actively negotiated with 2, and selected Constellation 
Holdings.44 Under the parties’ agreement, Constellation would pay $1.1 
billion for the assets of Boston Generating, and Boston Generating would 
file for bankruptcy and seek prompt bankruptcy court approval of the sale 
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.45 
As of the bankruptcy filing, Boston Generating had $2 billion of debt, 
including $1.13 billion of first-lien debt under a First Lien Credit 
Agreement, $350 million of second-lien debt, and $422 million of 
unsecured debt.46 Under the proposed sale, the first-lien creditors would be 
paid nearly in full, while second-lien creditors and unsecured creditors 
would receive little or nothing.47 Not surprisingly, the second-lien creditors 
were much less enthusiastic about the proposed sale than the first-lien 
creditors. When the debtors asked the bankruptcy court to approve the sale 
to Constellation after an auction process that produced one other bid, the 
 
2010), which held that the subordinated creditors were precluded by their intercreditor agreement from 
seeking an examiner but nevertheless considered the merits of the examiner request). 
 38 See infra Section I.C. 
 39 440 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 40 In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 41 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
 42 Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 308. 
 43 Id. at 310. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 308–09. 
 47 Id. at 310. 
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agent for the second-lien creditors and several of the second-lien creditors 
objected.48 The agent for the first-lien creditors pointed to the parties’ 
intercreditor agreement as precluding the objection because the agreement 
gave the first-lien creditors the exclusive right to “enforce rights, exercise 
remedies . . . and make determinations” regarding the parties’ collateral.49 
The agent for the second-lien creditors countered that its objection was not 
interfering with the first-lien creditors’ exclusive enforcement rights and 
that it was simply making an objection that ordinary unsecured creditors 
make, as permitted by the agreement.50 
The bankruptcy court made two determinations, each of which has 
important implications for the treatment of intercreditor agreements. The 
court first ruled that the second-lien creditors could press their objection, 
despite the first-lien creditors’ exclusive right to exercise remedies.51 The 
court based this conclusion in part on a puzzling decision by the first-lien 
agent to stipulate that the first-lien creditors’ consent to (and other 
involvement in) the sale of assets did not constitute an “exercise of 
remedies” under the intercreditor agreement.52 But the court also 
emphasized the lack of clarity in the parties’ agreement. “If a secured 
lender seeks to waive its rights to object to a 363 sale,” the bankruptcy 
judge wrote, “it must be clear beyond peradventure that it has done so.”53 
The court contrasted the parties’ agreement with the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) model intercreditor agreement in this regard. Unlike 
the ABA model agreement, which explicitly states that the second-lien 
agent is deemed to consent to a section 363 sale that the first-lien agent 
approves, the “language in the Intercreditor Agreement [in this case] falls 
short of such clarity.”54 
The court’s second ruling pointed in the opposite direction. Although 
the judge permitted the second-lien creditors to object, she nevertheless 
allowed the sale to go through. The judge gave the second-lien creditors 
their day in court but did not let the objections derail the asset sale that 
Boston Generating had spent nearly two years arranging.55 
The ultimate outcome of the hearing makes the contrast between 
Boston Generating and two earlier cases that had enforced the literal terms 
 
 48 Id. at 306. 
 49 Id. at 319. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 320. 
 52 Id. at 317–18. 
 53 Id. at 319. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 335–36. 
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of intercreditor agreements less stark than it initially appears. In In re 
Erickson Retirement Communities, LLC56 and In re Ion Media Networks, 
Inc.,57 several bankruptcy courts relied on the explicit language of the 
intercreditor agreement to deny standing to second-lien creditors. 
Distinguishing the two cases, the Boston Generating court pointed out that 
the intercreditor agreements in the earlier cases were much clearer. But the 
courts in the two earlier cases also seem to have been mindful of the effect 
their rulings would have on the outcome of each case. In both Erickson and 
Ion Media Networks, the second-lien creditors’ actions threatened to bog 
down a case that was otherwise close to resolution. By denying standing in 
Erickson, the court avoided statutory language that suggests an examiner 
must be appointed if a creditor requests one.58 Similarly, in Ion Media, 
denying standing silenced a second-lien creditor that was far out of the 
money and appeared to be objecting in the hope of being bought off.59 By 
contrast, in Boston Generating, the court allowed the objection but did not 
permit it to derail the debtor’s proposed sale. 
Boston Generating places a premium on careful drafting of 
intercreditor agreements and also suggests that bankruptcy courts may be 
keeping one eye on the pragmatic implications of permitting second-lien 
creditors to take action in the face of contractual language that appears to 
require their silence. In this case and the related Erickson and Ion Media 
Networks cases, the courts focused primarily on the scope and validity of 
the agreements, without carefully considering the choice of remedy that 
courts would provide if they concluded that the agreements were 
enforceable.60 
 
 56 425 B.R. 309 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010). 
 57 419 B.R. 585 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 58 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). For evidence that courts often decline to appoint examiners even 
when ostensibly required to appoint them, see Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners 
and the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 59 See, e.g., Ion Media, 419 B.R. at 597–98 (noting, as it considered the language of the agreement, 
that even the first-lien creditors were likely to receive only a fraction of what the $850 million they 
were owed because the debtor was not worth more than $310–$455 million). 
 60 Boston Generating and the two prior cases also raise the question of just what specific 
performance means. In Ion Media, the effect of specific performance was not clear given that the court 
was fully informed about the objection it declined to hear and essentially addressed the objections. See 
id. at 598 (stating that “[d]espite the determination that Cyrus lacks standing to object to the Plan, the 
Court recognizes that it has an independent obligation to review the Plan to make sure that it satisfies 
the standards for plan confirmation”). In Erickson, specific performance may have made a more 
tangible difference because it removed a demand for an examiner. But here too, the court essentially 
considered the requested action before concluding that the request was precluded by the parties’ 
intercreditor agreement. See 425 B.R. at 316–17 (declining to appoint examiner). We will attempt to 
sort out these issues later in this Article. See infra Section III.B (providing framework for determining 
the parties’ rights). 
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B. The Intercreditor Dispute in Momentive 
The Momentive bankruptcy was hotly contested from the outset, and 
it produced important decisions on difficult issues that might have been 
avoided if the parties had managed to settle, as the bankruptcy judge 
strongly hinted they should do. Momentive, a silicone and quartz 
manufacturer that had been acquired in 2006 by Apollo Global 
Management, the well-known private equity fund, proposed a “deathtrap” 
reorganization plan. The “deathtrap” reorganization plan gave its senior 
creditors a choice between either accepting the plan, which promised 
payment in cash in full but required the creditors to waive a $200 million 
make-whole claim,61 or rejecting the plan, asserting their make-whole 
claim, and receiving replacement notes plus the cramdown rate of interest.62 
Although the senior creditors rejected the plan, the bankruptcy court held 
that they were not entitled to a make-whole payment and confirmed the 
proposed plan under the cramdown provision.63 The senior creditors then 
brought a state court damages action against the junior creditors under the 
parties’ intercreditor agreement. The senior creditors argued that the junior 
creditors’ support for the reorganization plan violated the agreement and 
that any distributions to the junior creditors needed to be turned over to the 
senior creditors because the agreement required that the senior creditors be 
paid in full before the junior creditors received any distribution. The junior 
creditors responded by removing the litigation to federal court and having it 
referred to the bankruptcy court.64 
 
 61 A “make-whole” provision requires a breaching promisor to pay a fee designed to compensate 
the promisee for profits lost as a result of the breach. In a loan contract, the lost profits often consist 
largely of not-yet accrued interest payments. Some courts have enforced make-whole payments, see, 
e.g., In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 842 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the make-
whole provision must be honored); In re Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 13-10125 (KJC), 2013 WL 1838513, 
at *17–19 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 22, 2013) (concluding that a make-whole provision was a legitimate 
liquidated damages provision, not unmatured interest, which would be precluded by section 502(b)(2)), 
while other courts have rejected them, see, e.g., In re MPM Silicones LLC, 531 B.R. 321, 336 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that a make-whole provision was not enforceable because it did not “clearly 
and unambiguously call for the payment of the make-whole premium in the event of an acceleration of 
debt”), aff’d No. 15-1682, 2017 WL 4772248 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2017) . 
 62 MPM Silicones, 531 B.R. at 326; see also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) 
(holding that the cramdown rate of interest can be determined by using the formula approach, which 
starts with the prime rate and adjusts based on risk of nonpayment). 
 63 MPM Silicones, 531 B.R. at 332. 
 64 An obvious question raised by this sequence of events is why the senior creditors brought a 
damages action rather than seeking to prevent Momentive from confirming a reorganization plan that 
would give distributions to the junior creditors. One possible explanation for the senior creditors’ 
approach is that courts generally have not required that a reorganization plan comply with an 
intercreditor agreement so long as the promisee’s rights under the agreement are preserved. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012) (requiring a court to confirm a nonconsensual plan notwithstanding the 
enforceability of subordination agreements); see also, e.g., In re Croatan Surf Club, LLC, No. 11-
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The senior creditors’ alternative strategy failed. Explicitly endorsing 
the Boston Generating standard that the waivers of junior creditors’ rights 
must be “clear beyond peradventure,” the bankruptcy court rejected each of 
the senior creditors’ arguments.65 Much as the agreement in Boston 
Generating failed to specify that junior creditors could not object to a 
section 363 sale that senior creditors approved, the agreement here focused 
on the parties’ collateral and liens, rather than on their right to payment. 
“[T]he ICA is very clearly an intercreditor agreement pertaining to the 
parties’ rights in respect of shared collateral,” the court concluded.66 “That 
is the overall context of the Agreement, and it is in that context that the 
complaints’ claims should be evaluated.”67 Because the junior creditors’ 
support for Momentive’s plan did not interfere with the senior creditors’ 
liens or collateral in any way, the junior creditors’ actions were not barred 
by the intercreditor agreement.68 The court also ruled that the junior 
creditors were entitled to contest the amount of the senior creditors’ claims  
because the agreement lacked the explicit “silent seconds” lien provisions 
often included in intercreditor agreements.69 
C. The Intercreditor Dispute in RadioShack 
In RadioShack, the creditor coalitions were more complex than in any 
of the cases discussed thus far.70 RadioShack had two main groups of 
secured lenders: the ABL lender group, which held a first lien on 
RadioShack’s liquid assets and a second lien on its intellectual property 
securing a $585 million obligation, and SCP, which held a second lien on 
the liquid assets and a first lien on the intellectual property securing a $250 
million loan.71 Each of the loans was divided into multiple tranches. The 
 
00194-8-SWH, 2011 WL 5909199, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2011) (“[A] court can confirm a 
plan which disrupts bargained for priority, and thus is inconsistent with the terms of a subordination 
agreement, as long as it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly.”); In re TCI 2 Holdings, 
LLC, 428 B.R. 117, 140–41 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2010) (noting that section 1129(b) provides for 
confirmation of plans even when parties have violated intercreditor agreements on supporting the plan); 
see also In re Tribune Co., 472 B.R. 223, 241 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (citing TCI 2 Holdings, 428 B.R. at 
141), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 12-CV-1072 GMS, 2014 WL 2797042 (D. Del. June 18, 2014), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 65 MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 750 (citing In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 66 Id. at 746. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 750–52. 
 69 Id. at 752 (contrasting the agreement here to the much more restrictive provisions in the 
agreement in In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 313 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010)). 
 70 For an overview of the loans and the dispute discussed in the text that follows, see Borders et al., 
supra note 16. 
 71 In re RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
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relationship between the ABL and SCP loans was coordinated by an 
intercreditor agreement, and relations within each lender group by AALs.72 
The ABL lender group was divided into two groups, referred to as the 
first-out and second-out lenders.73 The lightning rod for the dispute was a 
proposal by Standard General, which held a “second out” position in the 
ABL lien to buy a large number of RadioShack’s stores in partnership with 
Sprint. Under the proposal, Standard General would be permitted to credit 
bid its claim.74 Although it was clear to everyone that RadioShack’s assets 
needed to be sold, Salus, one of the lenders in the SCP lender group (and 
the agent for the group’s loans), asked the bankruptcy court to prohibit 
Standard General from credit bidding. Salus argued that Standard General’s 
credit bid violated the priority terms of the intercreditor agreement between 
the ABL and SCP group.75 To further complicate matters, the first-out 
lenders in the ABL group sided with Salus in opposing the bid by Standard 
General. They argued that a credit bid by Standard General violated their 
AAL with Standard General.76 
 
 72 Id. at 704–05. 
 73 See id. at 705. 
 74 A “credit bid” is a bid that consists of a lien creditor’s promise to release some or all of its lien—
the amount to be released is the amount of the credit bid—if the bid is accepted, rather than a promise 
of new consideration. See generally RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 
639 (2012) (holding that secured lenders must be permitted to credit bid a debtor proposes to sell assets 
in connection with a Chapter 11 plan). 
 75 The basis for this objection was hotly contested. The ABL lenders had converted some of their 
revolving loans into term loans. Salus argued that under the intercreditor agreement, the term loans 
were junior in priority to the SCP loans. At the time of bankruptcy, $129 million of the term loans had 
been repaid and $103 million remained outstanding. Salus argued that it was entitled to the $129 million 
that had been paid to the ABL lenders and that the $103 million outstanding debt was junior to the SCP 
loan and therefore could not be credit bid. See generally Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of 
Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures; (II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III) 
Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (No. 15-10197); Objection of Salus Capital 
Partners, LLC to Debtors’ Sale Motion, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 
15-10197); Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., RadioShack 
Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Debtors’ Consolidated Reply to Objections 
to Going Concern Sale, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); see 
also Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16; Transcript of Hearing, RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (No. 
15-10197) (March 31, 2015). 
 76 The details of the interplay of the indemnity and the credit bid are complex. At its most simple, 
the term loan priority litigation between Salus on the one side and the ABL group on the other could 
result in the ABL group owing $129 million to Salus after the sale. The first-out lenders were concerned 
that if the sale went through before that litigation was resolved, they would be on the hook for some or 
all of that $129 million. They claimed that the possibility that they would be liable without protection 
violated their AAL with Standard General, which provided that Standard General could not recover 
anything (and thus, they argued, could not credit bid) until the first-out lenders were paid in full. They 
read “paid in full” to include reassurance that they would not have to disgorge any payments they had 
already received. Thus, the first-out lenders argued that Standard General had to resolve the $129 
million litigation or provide reliable indemnity protection before the credit bid could go through. See 
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Things were equally complicated on the SCP side. Another SCP group 
lender, Cerberus, took Standard General’s side in the dispute. Cerberus 
argued that the SCP group’s agreement among lenders prohibited Salus 
from objecting to any sale that Cerberus had agreed to.77 While Cerberus 
had initially consented to Salus’s objection, it changed its position shortly 
before the sale hearings.78 Salus argued that the initial consent barred 
Cerberus from interfering with its objection.79 
The court resolved some of these disputes but not others. On the first-
out lender’s objection to Standard General’s credit bid, the court merely 
urged settlement and signaled that it was unlikely to grant the first-out 
lenders’ full request to use the AAL to block the credit bid.80 The 
bankruptcy court did, however, allow Cerberus to use its AAL to block 
Salus’s objections to the sale. The court rejected Salus’s argument that 
Cerberus was precluded from revoking its consent. “The plain language of 
Section 14(c) [of the agreement among lenders] does not restrict Cerberus 
from settling or otherwise changing its position or its mind,” the court said; 
“and, indeed, to construe the document otherwise would be demonstrably 
contrary to Cerberus’s presumed contractual expectations . . . .”81 Cerberus 
then had the right to agree to a sale, and that agreement blocked Salus from 
asserting the SCP group’s rights to object to a sale. As a result, the sale 
went forward. 
The agreements in RadioShack arguably were clearer than the 
agreement in Momentive, and Salus’s objection was more obviously 
 
generally Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders, supra note 75; Objection of the First Out 
ABL Lenders to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale 
Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp., 550 
B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Supplemental Brief in Support of the First Out 
Lenders’ Objection to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and 
Sale Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related Relief, RadioShack Corp., 
550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Response of Standard General L.P. to the 
Objection of the First Out ABL Lenders to the Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) 
Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures, (II) Approving the Sale of Assets and (III) Granting Related 
Relief RadioShack Corp., 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (No. 15-10197); Debtors’ Consolidated 
Reply to Objections to Going Concern Sale, supra note 75; see also Transcript of Hearing, supra note 
16; Transcript of Hearing, supra note 75. 
 77 Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., supra note 75, at 2–
3; see also Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 22–25, 29–30. 
 78 See Statement of Cerberus Lenders in Support of Sale to General Wireless, Inc., supra note 75, 
at 2–3 (filed five days before the sale hearings). 
 79 Id. at 34–37. 
 80 Id. at 72 (referring to requested relief as “silly”); id. at 87 (referring to demands as “screwy” and 
noting a lack of enthusiasm for granting them); id. at 97 (noting “no possibility” of the request reserve 
being posted); id. at 100 (noting “the fix I am in” with regard to granting the requested relief if the sale 
of RadioShack is going to happen). 
 81 Id. at 63. 
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precluded by the AAL terms. Perhaps these facts fully explain the court’s 
ruling. But it does not seem coincidental that the ruling, together with the 
court’s failure to rule on the first-out lenders’ objection to Salus’s credit 
bid, also had the effect of removing potential obstacles to the best deal 
available for selling RadioShack’s assets. 
D. Implications 
One obvious effect of these recent intercreditor disputes is to raise 
significant questions about the assumption that intercreditor agreements 
reduce transaction costs by keeping some parties silent.82 Perhaps 
intercreditor agreements will serve this function as they evolve, and as 
courts interpret them in more consistent fashion. But the agreements have 
prompted extensive litigation, as parties who agreed to be silent have raised 
objections and entered into deals to defect that may have violated their side 
agreements. They appear to have magnified transaction costs, rather than 
reduced them. 
In their handling of intercreditor agreement disputes, courts seem to 
focus primarily on the scope of the agreement—that is, the question 
whether the promisor has violated the agreement—and much less on the 
question of what remedy is appropriate in the event of a breach. A common 
theme in the cases is that courts read the terms of an intercreditor 
agreement against the party who seeks to contract around the Bankruptcy 
Code, unless it is “clear beyond peradventure.”83 This approach may reflect 
the courts’ belief that enforcement of intercreditor agreements can have 
deleterious effects on the bankruptcy process as a whole. 
To increase the likelihood of enforcement, lenders can be expected to 
make their future agreements broader. This in fact is precisely what 
bankruptcy professionals have begun to advise. “In the future,” a prominent 
law firm wrote after summarizing the RadioShack dispute, “senior creditors 
would be well advised to demand specific and far-reaching protections that 
cover more than pure collateral enforcement.”84 In response to the 
Momentive court’s narrow reading of the lien subordination in the parties’ 
intercreditor agreement, another prominent law firm recommended that 
senior creditors consider asking for, among other things, a broader 
provision requiring “[t]urnover of distributions received in respect of the 
 
 82 See generally Morrison, supra note 31, at 726 (noting that cost savings are an important benefit 
of intercreditor agreements, but also pointing out the potential for exploitation). 
 83 See, e.g., In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 84 Michael A. Rosenthal & Josh Weisser, Silence is Golden: Second Lien Creditor Rights Post-
Momentive 3, GIBSON DUNN (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/ 
Silence-Is-Golden--Second-Lien-Creditor-Rights-Post-Momentive.pdf [https://perma.cc/95FZ-LQUM]. 
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junior lien creditor’s secured claim, regardless of source or form, as 
opposed to only distributions of collateral or proceeds thereof.”85 
It is not clear, however, that broader agreements will result in better 
outcomes than the parties’ current agreements when all stakeholders are 
taken into account. What is needed is a better understanding of the costs 
and benefits of side agreements, and a theory as to whether and to what 
extent the agreements should be enforced. In the next Part, we attempt to 
provide such a theory. Our analysis suggests that courts should focus less 
on the scope of the agreements and more on the appropriate remedy. 
II. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL OF SIDE AGREEMENTS AND 
DEFECTIONS 
In this Part, we provide a simple theoretical framework that helps to 
identify the costs and benefits of enforcing side agreements in the presence 
of deals to defect. The theory, in turn, helps us understand the reasons 
parties write these agreements and the sources of externalities that 
bankruptcy law may help solve. 
A. Background Principles 
Underlying our analysis is the foundational normative theory of 
bankruptcy known as the Creditors’ Bargain theory.86 The Creditors’ 
Bargain theory says that an ideal bankruptcy outcome is one that 
maximizes the expected value of the firm ex ante.87 This translates to the 
outcome that would be chosen by a sole owner—a hypothetical individual 
who owns all of the firm’s assets on the bankruptcy petition date.88 The sole 
owner would choose to dispose of the company’s assets—deciding whether 
to reorganize, liquidate, or sell the assets as a going concern, and 
determining the timing of this decision—in a way that maximizes the 
company’s value. If the firm’s creditors could collectively agree to an 
 
 85 Damian S. Schaible & Kenneth J. Steinberg, Momentive: Intercreditor Agreement Issues 8, 
DAVIS POLK, http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/ 
Momentive.Intercreditor.Agreement.Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM39-GWQW]. 
 86 JACKSON, supra note 1; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations 
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) (exploring the rights of secured creditors in 
bankruptcy); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (developing the “Creditors’ Bargain theory”). 
 87 More precisely, the optimal bankruptcy framework will maximize the expected value of the firm 
across all states of its existence. A bankruptcy rule that increased the value of the bankruptcy estate but 
reduced the non-bankruptcy value (by distorting non-bankruptcy incentives) would violate the 
Creditors’ Bargain theory if the reduction outweighed the increase. 
 88 See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 86, at 104–09 (describing how the decisionmaking of a 
group of diverse owners should follow that of a sole owner). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
274 
outcome once bankruptcy occurs, they would choose to act as a sole owner 
would act because this would maximize the total recovery for all the 
creditors. Thus, when we refer to an outcome as efficient or inefficient, the 
sole owner’s decision will be our efficiency benchmark. 
Corporate bankruptcy law is built on the premise that a debtor’s 
contracts with its creditors will not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome 
in bankruptcy because the creditors are not coordinated either ex ante, 
when they lend to the debtor, or ex post, when bankruptcy occurs.89 
Bankruptcy’s automatic stay, which prevents creditors from seizing the 
debtor’s assets upon bankruptcy, is one of bankruptcy law’s mandatory 
(nonwaivable) terms.90 It is based on the premise that a debtor and a 
creditor would not be expected to contract for a stay on their own, even if 
the collective creditor body would benefit from it. Nor will a creditor 
voluntarily postpone collection at bankruptcy. She may instead have the 
incentive to “race to the courthouse” to get a bigger share of the bankruptcy 
estate for herself. Though this negatively affects the other creditors, the 
debtor and the particular creditor will not, in general, be expected to 
internalize any impact their contract has on the other stakeholders.91 
The Creditors’ Bargain theory argues that when the sole owner 
principle is at risk, the law is justified in altering the creditor’s rights. Of 
particular importance for our analysis, the specific enforcement remedy the 
creditor would be entitled to pursue outside bankruptcy is often replaced 
with compensation that approximates the value of that remedy. A secured 
creditor upon bankruptcy can no longer seize collateral, as it could do 
outside bankruptcy, but the Bankruptcy Code gives the secured creditor the 
right to receive adequate protection payments in lieu of the repossession 
right.92 
 
 89 See JACKSON, supra note 1. For skepticism about this traditional rationale, see, e.g., Randal C. 
Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 669–70 (1992) 
(arguing that security interests could be used to address collective action problems); Alan Schwartz, A 
Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2005) (questioning the need for 
an expansive, state-supplied bankruptcy framework). 
 90 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
 91 There are contractual devices to mitigate these externalities. An early creditor might include 
covenants that limit the rights a borrower can grant subsequent lenders so as to minimize these 
externalities. But these contractual devices are imperfect for both legal and practical reasons. See, e.g., 
Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1773 
(2013) (analyzing the limits of covenants under existing law and advocating that they be given binding 
effect). 
 92 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012). This is not to say that U.S. law always provides the amount of 
compensation that the Creditors’ Bargain theorist would advocate. Most notably, the Bankruptcy Code 
does not give an undercollateralized secured creditor compensation for the lost time value of money. 
See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988). 
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B. Side Agreements and Defections 
The background principles above are well known, and the use of 
bankruptcy law to replace a specific performance remedy with damages 
when the contract is between the debtor and a creditor is well accepted. But 
what, if anything, changes when the contract is between two creditors? It is 
less obvious that a side agreement between creditors implicates the same 
issues. Because creditors compete in bankruptcy for the common pool of 
debtor assets, it is clear that a contract with the debtor that provides better 
treatment to one creditor can be to the detriment of the other creditors. But 
the effect that a side agreement between creditors has on the nonparty 
stakeholders is not as evident. If a side agreement merely reshuffles the 
value that these parties are entitled to receive from the debtor, it is hardly 
an issue for bankruptcy law to interfere with. 
Moreover, these side agreements might be expected to help the 
nonparty stakeholders. Side agreements should create incentives for the 
parties to the agreement to deal with other parties in ways that maximize 
the joint value of their collective claims. To be sure, the side agreements 
will not be written in the interests of all creditors. But the agreements might 
be expected to consolidate the side agreement parties to the equivalent of a 
single party who owns all the claims of the coalition. 
For example, suppose a senior creditor (S) and a junior creditor (J) 
each make $100 loans secured by the same $200 asset, and they write an 
intercreditor agreement that governs their relationship in bankruptcy. We 
might expect that if bankruptcy occurs, the intercreditor agreement will be 
written so that the S and J coalition will take the same actions that a single 
secured creditor with a $200 loan against the asset would take. If the 
intercreditor agreement transforms S and J into a single, unified actor, the 
agreement could reduce fragmentation and increase the scope for value-
creating bargains with the debtor’s other creditors that bankruptcy law tries 
to create. In such cases, the side agreements increase the ex ante value of 
the debtor and are consistent with the Creditors’ Bargain theory. 
The numerical examples below demonstrate, however, that this 
intuition is only true in some, but not all, cases. When bargaining frictions 
between the parties to a side agreement exist, the side agreement can create 
negative externalities. Bargaining frictions might occur because the senior 
loan position is held by a group of lenders in a syndicate, and the terms of 
the syndicated loan agreement require a high degree of consensus among 
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the lenders to restructure any key terms.93 When bargaining is imperfect, 
the side agreement may steer the parties toward outcomes that favor the 
side agreement parties at the expense of the other nonparty stakeholders of 
the debtor. The side agreement parties may even use the threat of negative 
externalities to attempt to extract value from these stakeholders. This can 
reduce overall value of the debtor’s estate in the bankruptcy process (and 
thus increase ex ante cost of finance) when the parties’ attempts to keep 
more of the surplus for themselves make it less likely that a value-creating 
defection will occur through bargaining. In short, the side agreement 
parties do not take into account the benefits that other stakeholders receive 
from defections; hence, side agreements foreclose defections too often. 
1. Setup and Assumptions 
Suppose that parties S and J write a side agreement before bankruptcy. 
The concrete example we have in mind is two creditors who agree to take a 
senior (S) and a junior (J) lien on the same collateral, but the example can 
apply to any two parties who are stakeholders in a company. S and J will be 
expected to choose the terms that maximize the expected value of their 
combined claims. 
Party C is also a stakeholder in the company, but C is not a party to 
the ex ante side agreement between S and J. This could occur because C 
comes along after the agreement is signed, or because C became a creditor 
before the transaction but was not actively monitoring the debtor and is 
thus uninvolved with the negotiation of the side agreement when it occurs.94 
C can be thought of as an unsecured creditor, whose interests are often 
more aligned with J than with S.95 
In order for our problem to be interesting and realistic, there must be 
some impediment to bargaining over outcomes in bankruptcy. The Coase 
Theorem tells us that if all interested stakeholders bargain perfectly, the 
sole owner principle will always hold and the efficient outcome will always 
occur under any bankruptcy rules.96 But bargaining frictions in bankruptcy 
 
 93 See, e.g., Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from 
Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007) (discussing renegotiation rights of lenders in syndicated 
loans). 
 94 To keep the discussion simple, we do not explicitly involve the debtor in the negotiation of the 
side agreement, but we suspect that this would not affect our analysis significantly. The debtor will 
want to borrow at the lowest possible interest rate from S and J, so a side agreement between S and J 
that maximizes the joint payoff of S and J in bankruptcy would be preferred by the debtor as well. 
 95 Junior lienholders in bankruptcy are also unsecured creditors to the extent that their collateral 
value is less than what they are owed. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). Thus, an unsecured creditor is 
more likely to prefer the junior lienholder’s preferred action than the senior creditor’s preferred action 
when they disagree. 
 96 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1, 2–8 (1960). 
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are common and can occur for many reasons. One reason is coordination 
problems caused by the fragmentation of claims. Large corporate loans are 
often broken into pieces and held by many holders; in such cases, 
coordinating these diverse holders can take time. We represent these 
frictions in our theory in a simple fashion by assuming that one of the 
parties is unable to bargain. 
For the first part of our discussion, we consider examples in which S 
will not be able to bargain, but C will be able to negotiate with J to agree to 
a defection if a mutually beneficial deal is available. These assumptions 
will not be true in all cases, and we relax them in subsequent examples, but 
they track a common pattern in the cases where junior lien holders align 
themselves with unsecured creditors after the debtor files for bankruptcy.97 
When analyzing the incentives of S and J to write the side agreement, we 
will assume that S and J fully anticipate the parties that will be available to 
bargain and the likely payoffs. 
Some uncertainty will, however, remain over payoffs at bankruptcy. 
We represent this through two possible “states of the world” that may occur 
at bankruptcy, each with equal probability. The states can be analogized to 
the future prospects of the company when the bankruptcy occurs, which 
may be more or less favorable depending on conditions that are hard to 
forecast in advance (at the time when the debtor borrows). We will suppose 
that these conditions are known and observable to everyone on the 
bankruptcy date, but they are sufficiently hard to describe in advance such 
that S and J cannot write a contract that is conditioned on the state of the 
world. 98 
Whatever the state of the world, there will be two possible actions, 
action R and action L, that can be chosen. For concreteness, one can think 
of “R” as an action that makes a more prolonged reorganization process 
more likely, while “L” is an action that might lead to a quicker sale or 
liquidation. But, more generally, the model applies to any two possible 
strategies that party J would be free to pursue absent a side agreement, 
which are payoff-relevant and may affect what happens to the bankrupt 
company’s assets. For example, suppose that the debtor, at the behest of the 
senior creditor, makes a motion to liquidate the company and J has the 
 
 97 The Momentive and Boston Generating cases are examples in which a second-lien creditor took 
actions that opposed a first-lien creditor and potentially stood to benefit the unsecured creditors. See 
supra Sections II.A., II.B. 
 98 For example, the sale versus reorganization decision might depend on whether key employees 
decide to stay with the company or go elsewhere. These key employees might be easily observable at 
the time of bankruptcy but hard to identify in advance of bankruptcy when the intercreditor agreement 
is written. 
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option to be silent or exercise its legal right to raise an objection to the 
liquidation. Alternatively, J might express an interest in providing a debtor-
in-possession loan that facilitates a reorganization plan proposed by C.99 
We make one final assumption concerning the bargaining process. 
Whenever a deal to defect between J and C is possible, they will reach an 
agreement that makes J and C collectively better off, and any surplus as a 
result of the deal will be split evenly between J and C. The 50/50 split of 
surplus is not essential to our results, but our results do rely importantly on 
the idea that C captures at least some of the surplus in bargaining with J. 
2. Examples 
 
Example 1: Side agreements align with efficiency 
 
Good State (p=.5) Bad State (1−p=.5) 
 
R L R L 
S 120 200 120 200 
J 20 0 20 0 
C 70 0 10 0 
S+J 140 200 140 200 
S+J+C 210 200 150 200 
 
We start with Example 1, which demonstrates the potential benefit of 
side agreements. The table shows the direct payoffs—the payoffs that 
would result absent any side agreements or defections—to parties S, J, and 
C, which depend upon the state of the world and the chosen action. In this 
example, S and J have divergent interests in both states: S prefers action L 
and J prefers action R. Collectively, though, S and J’s total direct payoffs 
favor action L in both states, as their collective payoff is 200 under action L 
and 140 under action R. The good and bad states differ only in C’s payoff. 
C’s direct payoff favors action R, and thus C’s preferences align with J’s. 
To make an analogy between the example and the real world, party S 
might favor a fast sale of the company in bankruptcy (action L), rather than 
 
 99 The setup here is based on the framework of incomplete financial contracts from Philippe 
Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 473, 475–79 (1992). To suit the issue at hand, we make important modifications to their setup, 
including the existence of the side party and the assumption that S cannot bargain. Because the 
bargaining parties are usually creditors, we do not assume that one of the two parties has no wealth, 
which is the key source of bargaining frictions in the Aghion and Bolton model. See id. at 475. 
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a long and protracted reorganization process (action R). J, the junior 
creditor, may be “out of the money” and would not stand to receive any 
payoff if the company is immediately sold. This might cause J to raise 
objections or employ delay tactics to slow the process down. This might 
benefit C, who represents unsecured or other lower priority creditors, who 
also favor delay. But, importantly, J’s preferred action will hurt S more 
than it helps J; thus, S and J have an incentive to strike a side agreement 
that induces J to consider S’s payoff when it chooses an action. 
a. Status quo actions 
Under the status quo (no side agreements or defections), J would 
choose action R in both states, to get 20 instead of 0. The S+J coalition 
would receive a total payoff of 140 in both states. 
This choice would be efficient in the good state because the total 
payoffs of all parties (S+J+C) are 210 under action R and 200 under action 
L. But it would be inefficient in the bad state, as action L generates a larger 
payoff for all parties (200) than action R (150). Because the good state and 
bad state occur with equal probability, the status quo would produce a total 
expected payoff to all parties of 180.100 
Now, let’s suppose that S and J can write a side agreement that 
maximizes the expected payoff of the S and J coalition. We will first 
analyze the best agreement S and J could write, assuming that the parties 
provide that the agreement will be enforced via specific performance. We 
will then do the same analysis assuming the parties contract for stipulated 
damages, and we will compare the two possibilities to see which remedy S 
and J will choose. We will then examine whether the choice leads to an 
efficient outcome. 
b. Side agreement enforced by specific performance (SP) 
First, let’s consider the side agreement S and J would write, supposing 
for the moment that any side agreement can be enforced specifically by S. 
SP implies that S can require that J choose action L. Because the parties 
anticipate S’s inability to negotiate, a decision to require action L will 
always lead to action L being chosen, even if C were willing to pay any 
amount to have the decision changed to R. 
Under SP, S and J will write an agreement that requires that J choose 
action L. S+J will prefer this outcome to the status quo with no side 
agreement. J will agree to choose action L, and the S+J coalition will 
receive 200 in both states. This is preferred to the status quo, where the S+J 
 
 100 The expected value is calculated by multiplying the probability of each state times the payoff of 
all the parties (S+J+C) in that state and adding it up. In this case, we have .5×210 + .5×150 = 180.  
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coalition would receive only 140 in both states. But it leads to an inefficient 
outcome in the good state because the S+J coalition does not take C’s value 
into account. 
If the choice were between the status quo and a SP contract, the SP 
contract is preferred from an efficiency perspective. The total expected 
value under SP is 200, which is greater than the expected 180 payoff under 
the status quo. It is not always true, however, that a SP contract is preferred 
to the status quo from an efficiency standpoint whenever the parties choose 
it. If, for example, we increase C’s payoff by more than 20 in both states 
when action R is chosen, then the status quo payoff will be larger than 200. 
Generally, SP contracts may increase or decrease efficiency relative to the 
status quo because the parties do not internalize the effects of their contract 
on C. 
c. Side agreement enforced by stipulated damages (SD) 
Using the numbers in Example 1, S and J can improve upon SP by 
enforcing their side agreement through damages. Let “d” denote the SD 
payment in the side agreement between S and J. When the agreement is 
enforced through damages, J can choose to breach the side agreement and 
choose action R if it is willing to pay d. This opens the door for C to make 
a deal to defect with J to encourage the breach. Because S and J seek to 
maximize their joint payoff, they will take any anticipated payment from C 
to J into account when they decide on the right level of damages. 
Here, S and J will write a contract that requires J to choose action L 
and pay d = 90 to S if it chooses action R. They will choose damages of 90 
because it elicits the maximum possible side payment from C to encourage 
the breach in the good state. Their logic is as follows: In the good state, the 
J+C coalition prefers action R to action L by 90: J prefers action R by 20, 
and C prefers R by 70. Hence, C can only convince J to breach and choose 
action R if C pays J the entire 70 it would gain from action R. If C offers 
any payment lower than 70, J will perform under the side agreement and 
choose action L. In the good state, then, J will breach the contract and 
choose action R. C will make a side payment of 70 to J, and J will pay 90 
in damages to S. In the good state, taking side payments into account, the 
S+J coalition will get a total payoff of 210. 
In the bad state, J will choose action L. In the bad state, C+J’s direct 
payoffs would only increase by 30 if they chose action R, so it will not be 
in their joint interest to pay 90 in damages to S. Hence, in the bad state, the 
S+J coalition will get a total payoff of 200. 
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d. Side agreement enforced by expectation damages (ED) 
We just showed that when parties choose a SD contract, they will 
choose to set damages at 90. This level of damages is higher than ED—the 
damages that would give S the same payoff under breach that S would 
receive when the contract is performed. Breach of a promise by J to choose 
action L would reduce S’s payoff by only 80 in this example (200 – 120). 
As is well known, ED gives J the incentive to breach efficiently. In this 
example, J will choose to breach and choose action R in the good state, and 
perform in the bad state. Though the parties choose damages that are higher 
than ED, there are no efficiency consequences to that choice in this 
example. 
e. Takeaways from Example 1 
There are several useful takeaways from our analysis in Example 1. 
First, a side agreement with a SP remedy improves upon the status quo for 
the S+J coalition, but it can be inefficient. This happens because the 
defection creates negative externalities on the outside creditor (C) by 
inducing action L in the good state. In this case, however, the optimal S+J 
side contract will not include SP. S+J will prefer a contract SD that results 
in action R being chosen in the good state and action L in the bad state, 
which is consistent with efficiency. 
Second, the S+J coalition chooses damages that are larger than ED. S 
loses only 80 when action R is chosen, but S+J contract for d = 90 to divert 
more value from C. In this case, there are no efficiency consequences to 
this redistribution of value, so our normative theory is unconcerned with 
the difference between SD and ED.101 But as we will show in Example 2, 
the difference can also matter for efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 101 As a doctrinal matter, courts distinguish between appropriate liquidated damages provisions, 
which are enforceable, and penalties, which are not. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In theory, they might therefore refuse to enforce a provision that provided 
for more than ED. But in practice, the lines are much fuzzier. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. 
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing “[t]he distinction between a penalty 
and liquidated damages [as] not an easy one to draw in practice”). In addition, a substantial body of 
theoretical work concludes that SD that promise more than the promisee’s expected loss can be 
efficient. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated 
Damages, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 147 (1984). We reach a similar conclusion in this Article, although our 
model will often call for the promisee’s remedy to be limited to ED. 
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Example 2: Side agreements lead to inefficiency; ED corrects the 
inefficiency 
 
Good State (p=.5) Bad State (1−p=.5) 
 
R L R L 
S 120 200 120 200 
J 20 0 20 0 
C 100 0 70 0 
S+J 140 200 140 200 
S+J+C 240 200 210 200 
 
Example 2 is similar to Example 1. S’s and J’s payoffs have not 
changed, but C has a stronger preference for action R in both states. In fact, 
C’s preference is so strong that action R is now the efficient action in both 
the good and bad states. 
Because S’s and J’s payoffs have not changed, the status quo, SP, and 
ED calculations are the same as under Example 1. But SD analysis is 
different in an important way: the side agreement may set the damages too 
high, leading to inefficient outcomes. 
a. Stipulated damages 
Under SD, the S+J coalition will face a trade-off when they set the 
terms of the side agreement. If they want to divert the most surplus from C 
in the good state, they will choose d = 120, so that (following Example 1) C 
will pay J its entire surplus of 100 in order to induce a breach. But if they 
do this, the damages will be so high that in the bad state, J will prefer not to 
breach and will choose action L. S+J will receive a total of 240 in the good 
state, and 200 in the bad state. Because the probability of each state is 50%, 
the S+J coalition would get an expected payoff of 220. 
Alternatively, S and J could set d = 90. This damage payment will 
induce C to pay its full surplus of 70 in the bad state. In the good state, 
however, C will keep some of its surplus. When C and J bargain to a deal 
to defect in the good state, they will bargain to a 50/50 split of any surplus 
that arises in moving from action L to action R. A quick calculation will 
verify that C will pay a side payment of 85 to J, in order to induce J to 
breach.102 
 
 102 Under action R, J+C together would get a direct payoff of 120, but pay damages of 90 to S. 
Under action L, they would get 0 and pay no damages. Thus, J+C would get a surplus of 120 – 90 = 30 
from choosing action R. Under a 50/50 split, C would keep a surplus of 15. Since C’s direct payoff is 
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Taking the side payments from C into account, if S+J choose d = 90, 
they would get 120 + 20 + 85 = 225 in the good state and 210 in the bad 
state. This has an expected value of 217.5. Because 217.5 less than 220, 
S+J will set the damages high (d = 120). This leads to an inefficient choice 
of action L in the bad state. 
Example 2 illustrates that SD can lead to inefficient outcomes. In an 
attempt to divert more of the surplus from C, S+J set the SD so high that C 
chooses not to bargain with J in the bad state. As a result, action L is 
chosen in the bad state instead of the efficient action R.103 
As in Example 1, if J were required to pay ED to S, it would pay only 
200 – 120 = 80 to S upon breach. As with Example 1, ED again yields an 
efficient outcome, as J will breach in both states and choose action R. In 
fact, ED will always lead to efficiency whenever the outside party (C) can 
freely bargain with J. To see this, note that C+J will strike a deal to defect 
to induce J to breach whenever the net gains to C and J exceed the 
damages. But the damages, because they are calculated using ED, are the 
net losses to S. Hence, C and J will internalize the costs of their action on 
S, making it the socially efficient choice. 
b. Takeaways from Example 2 
There are several new takeaways from Example 2. First, we saw in 
Example 1 that SP contracts can be detrimental to efficiency because they 
may inhibit a value-increasing bargain. In that example, the S+J coalition 
would prefer the more efficient SD contract. Example 2, by contrast, shows 
that a SD contract can lead to the same inefficiencies as SP. Again, the 
reason for inefficient side agreements is externalities: S and J do not have 
any incentive to consider the lost surplus that outside parties (C) sacrifice 
when the opportunity for a value-creating defection is lost due to 
excessively high damages. ED always lead to an efficient outcome, 
provided that the parties outside the side agreement can bargain with J. But 
the parties to the side agreement do not always have the incentive to write 
an agreement that leads to efficient outcomes, even if such an agreement is 
possible. 
Before moving on to applications of the theory, we should note a few 
caveats. In the two examples above, we have shown that SP contracts can 
 
100 in the good state, this means that C must pay 100 – 15 = 85 to J. Notice that J’s total payoff is the 
direct payoff plus the side payment minus the damages: 20 + 85 – 90 = 15. 
 103 This result is an application of a classic result in the antitrust literature, which shows that 
exclusive dealing contracts between a buyer and a seller can have anticompetitive effects by blocking a 
lower cost seller from entering a market. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier 
to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 388–89 (1987). To our knowledge, the application of this idea to 
bankruptcy law is novel. 
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be inefficient because they prevent efficient breaches too often. But we 
haven’t yet shown why the parties would choose a SP contract, 
notwithstanding its inefficiency. There are several reasons this could 
happen. For example, the parties might think—correctly or incorrectly—
that courts will underestimate ED payable upon breach. SP can also be part 
of an optimal contract when it is the promisee (S) and not the promisor (J) 
who has the ability to bargain with an outsider to defect. We provide 
examples of these possibilities in the Appendix. In these cases, it will often 
be efficient to replace the parties’ chosen remedy with ED. It is important 
to note, however, that replacing the parties’ choice of remedies with ED is 
not a panacea for all efficiency problems and can lead to worse outcomes if 
externalities are low. 
Our theory points out the costs and benefits of side agreements, but it 
notes that no alternative will provide a perfect solution for all sources of 
inefficiency that might arise. In the next section, we argue that while ED is 
not a perfect remedy, the Bankruptcy Code is better placed to handle the 
costs of ED than it is to handle the costs that arise from SP and SD. 
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
We can apply the results of the above analysis to develop a new 
framework for how courts should approach intercreditor disputes. To show 
how this framework plays out, we will revisit the disputes that faced courts 
in several recent high-profile bankruptcy cases104 and then conclude by 
considering a final key case that was not treated as an intercreditor dispute 
but raises the same issues. We maintain our assumptions that bankruptcy 
law has a primary goal of maximizing the value of the estate. We also 
assume that there are, in some cases, limitations on the ability of parties to 
bargain around certain outcomes. The key, then, is for judges to enforce 
intercreditor agreements in the way most consistent with the model we 
have laid out above. 
A. Basic Principles 
We briefly state some of the lessons from the model before delving 
into the cases. 
First, intercreditor agreements can reduce coordination problems 
between the parties to an agreement, and can thus maximize the joint value 
of their claims. This suggests that bankruptcy law need not interfere when 
the intercreditor agreement presents no risk of externalities. We define 
externalities as the potential to reduce the value of the estate for creditors 
 
 104 See supra Part I. 
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who are not party to the intercreditor agreement (these creditors are the Cs 
in our examples above). 
Second, side agreements, written to maximize the bankruptcy payoff 
of the parties to the agreement, can lead to inefficient outcomes when the 
party with the right to enforce (the promisee, or S) cannot bargain 
costlessly with other creditors in bankruptcy. Inefficiency can occur 
whether the parties contract for SP or SD. The inefficiency arises because 
the agreement between promisor (J) and promisee (S) does not take into 
account the benefits that nonparties would realize if a beneficial deal to 
defect were struck. Thus, the promisee and promisor may ex ante choose a 
remedy that puts a potentially efficient defection at risk in order to capture 
more of the surplus for themselves. Replacing SD or SD rights with ED 
eliminates this problem and leads to efficient outcomes when nonparties 
and the promisor can bargain, as long as the courts calculate ED properly. 
Finally, ED do not solve all bargaining problems or eliminate all 
externalities. ED do not always lead to efficiency when it is the promisor, 
and not the promisee, which cannot bargain with outside parties. Moreover, 
if damages are calculated in a biased way by courts, they will not give 
proper incentives to the promisor to internalize the effects of her actions on 
the promisee. 
While our theory so far helps us understand the costs and benefits of 
side agreements and various remedies in a qualitative way, it does not tell 
us which costs and benefits are quantitatively more important. To answer 
this question, we need to take a closer look at the costs associated with each 
remedy in the bankruptcy context. 
In bankruptcy proceedings, the errors introduced by SP and excessive 
SD and the errors introduced by ED are different in kind. SP and excessive 
SD force the promisor to under-assert its interests and rights. In some 
cases, the agreement forces the promisor to go along with the promisee 
even when it is in the promisor’s interest (either directly or because of a 
potential deal to defect) to do otherwise. If SP is fully enforced, the court is 
never exposed to information about the promisor’s interests in the estate.105 
More importantly, the bankruptcy process relies crucially on self-interested 
parties taking affirmative steps—such as providing new financing or 
collaborating on a plan of reorganization—that can benefit the other 
stakeholders. If some parties are silenced by a side agreement, there is little 
a court can do to compensate other stakeholders for that silence. 
 
 105 If the court considers a junior creditor’s objection before ruling that it is precluded by an 
intercreditor agreement, the information loss will be more limited. But even in this context, the court 
will have less information than it would if the issue were fully argued. 
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Another way to frame this idea, then, is to say that SP of an 
intercreditor agreement removes a key party from the bankruptcy process. 
This should be as concerning as actions that remove essential assets from 
the estate. The Bankruptcy Code is designed around the concept of 
coordinated behavior of stakeholders. At key junctures, the Bankruptcy 
Code depends on the actions of one creditor providing benefits to the estate 
as a whole.106 Most obviously, section 1129(a)(10) works this way: A plan 
of reorganization cannot be confirmed unless at least one class of impaired 
creditors votes in favor of it.107 This provides a compromise between 
requiring unanimous (or majority) approval and allowing confirmation of 
any plan. The Bankruptcy Code assumes that if an adversely affected class 
of creditors votes in favor of a plan, that plan must be doing more than 
merely shifting value to the debtor or to a senior class of creditors. But 
intercreditor agreements could render this protection meaningless. If a class 
of creditors is bound by an agreement to support a plan, their vote will not 
provide any information about the propriety of the plan. And agreements 
that silence other objections will have a similar effect.108 
Limiting the promisee to ED, on the other hand, allows the promisor 
to over-assert its interests and rights. Sometimes the promisor will assert its 
interests even when they cut against the overall interest of the estate. For 
instance, the promisor may object to a sale or vote in favor of a plan even 
when doing so destroys value.109 Given this possibility, the court will have 
to weigh the asserted interests of the promisor against the asserted interests 
of the promisee and the nonparty stakeholders. The difference, then, is 
essentially one of false negatives (from the standpoint of efficiency, the 
promisor is not asserting its rights enough) and false positives (from the 
standpoint of efficiency, the promisor is asserting its rights too often). 
These costs are different in kind because the false negatives destroy 
value-enhancing agreements or deprive the court and the parties of the 
information necessary to assess the impact of decisions on the value of the 
estate. A side agreement might prohibit a junior lien creditor from 
 
 106 See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. 
for Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 755, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767057 [https://perma.cc/MKU8-MTCC] (discussing the bargaining process 
and concessions between parties that ultimately lead to the emergence of a middle ground). 
 107 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 108 Similarly, agreements that prohibit a creditor from providing debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing would remove a viable lender from the process. Ultimately, any agreement that takes away a 
party’s role in assessing the worth of the estate or a plan is an agreement that can harm the estate as a 
whole. 
 109 The second-lien creditor’s numerous objections that threatened to hold up the reorganization of 
ION Media are an example of over-assertion of rights to obtain a more preferable settlement. See supra 
Section I.A. 
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providing debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.110 If the prohibition is 
specifically enforced, the value of the potential financing is never tested by 
the market or the bankruptcy court. And that value may have been such that 
it would have run to all stakeholders in the estate. Or a side agreement may 
prevent a junior lien creditor from objecting to a sale or voting in favor of a 
plan. Again, SP deprives the court of the information that would have been 
contained in the objection or the favorable vote. That lack of information 
may be detrimental to other dispersed and disorganized creditors who 
cannot bring objections (or support) on their own behalf. 
The false-positive costs from the over-assertion of rights are much 
more readily mitigated by the Bankruptcy Code. The main cost is merely 
that the court has to sift through extra information, which may impose a 
delay. But that is not a major cost. Indeed, weighing the merits of self-
interested arguments of stakeholders is precisely what bankruptcy courts 
and the Bankruptcy Code are set up to do. It is their primary function. 
Moreover, the entire Bankruptcy Code envisions a process whereby the 
court and stakeholders together resolve conflicting self-interests through a 
process of structured negotiation and litigation.111 
Thus, the costs of false positives imposed by ED are relatively small. 
When ED are inefficient, they merely require the court or the parties to do a 
little more information filtering. But SP and excessive SD deprive the court 
of valuable information and opportunities that could meaningfully enhance 
the value of the estate. 
B. The Proposed Framework 
The practical implication of our analysis is that courts should award 
ED rather than SP if there is a nontrivial likelihood of externalities. To be 
clear, courts should always enforce agreements for at least ED. Courts that 
have declined to give the promisee any remedy at all based on an unusually 
stringent interpretation of the scope of a side agreement have done so 
without justification. But SP or SD should only be available in the case 
 
 110 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012–2014 FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75 (2014), http://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h 
[https://perma.cc/YG6L-VKKS]; Mark N. Berman & David Lee, The Enforceability in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings of Waiver and Assignment of Rights Clauses Within Intercreditor or Subordination 
Agreements, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 1 (2011). 
 111 A secondary cost is litigation costs. But if litigation costs are included as part of the expected 
damages reward, this cost is born by the party who is over-asserting their rights and will deter over-
assertion. So, the real cost remains the court’s effort in deciding the matter. Moreover, for large 
corporate bankruptcies, at least in relative terms, litigations costs are low. How Much does Corporate 
Bankruptcy Cost?, NOVA L. GRP. (Nov. 5, 2009), http://novalawgroup.com/blog/?cat=28 
[https://perma.cc/95VW-FHSZ]. 
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where it is plain that there is no externality on the estate—that the dispute 
truly is contained in its impact to the creditors who were parties to the 
agreement. 
A court should, thus, first determine whether an intercreditor 
agreement creates externalities. Because our analysis suggests that the costs 
of limiting SP are small (essentially just marginal decision costs on the 
court) relative to the costs of allowing it (depriving the court of information 
and estate enhancing opportunities), we do suggest that courts should err on 
the side of assuming there is an externality and limiting SP. SP should only 
be allowable where the risk of externality is de minimis. When that is true, 
the agreement should be enforced as written. 
When, on the other hand, externalities are plausible, and a party seeks 
SP, we should first consider how our proposal would work in an ideal 
environment. If it were feasible, a perfect court would first assess whether 
there are bargaining hurdles between nonparties and either the promisee or 
the promisor. If bargaining hurdles exist only between the nonparties and 
the promisee, then ED is always preferable (assuming ED can be 
calculated). If there are bargaining hurdles between nonparties and the 
promisor, then the right remedy is ambiguous and the court would have to 
assess the actual level of externalities and only enforce agreements where 
doing so minimized externalities.112 
This ideal-world prescription is unlikely to work in practice. It would 
require a court to: (1) identify the relative bargaining hurdles and determine 
which parties can effectively enter into deals to defect and (2) identify the 
magnitude of externalities that would arise from enforcing a side agreement 
and those that would arise from not enforcing it. It may be easy enough for 
a court to assess whether externalities are likely to exist. But to ask a court 
to dig into the precise nature and magnitude of bargaining hurdles as well 
as externalities is essentially to ask the court to litigate out the value of the 
estate. Once the court has determined which parties can bargain with each 
other and the full effects that those bargains will have on all other 
stakeholders in the estate, the court will have essentially determined which 
paths are best for the estate and which are worst. It is meaningless at that 
point to talk about specifically enforcing an agreement not to allow a junior 
creditor to assert a right. If the right is beneficial to the estate, the court will 
say that the prohibition has externalities. If it is costly to the estate, the 
court will say it has no externalities. The right will have been asserted and 
fully adjudicated. Moreover, such an inquiry, to the extent it looks at 
 
 112 Bargaining hurdles on all sides would, of course, preclude deals to defect altogether and suggest 
that all bankruptcy decisions should be reviewed with an eye toward identifying externalities.  
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bargaining hurdles, may incentivize parties to create those hurdles where 
they do not otherwise exist. 
Thus, the first best world of judicial inquiry into the precise 
bargaining hurdles and externalities involved with every side agreement is 
not possible. Instead, we suggest, as a second-best solution, a blanket rule 
favoring ED in the plausible presence of externalities. This solution 
dominates the other alternatives (all SP, all SD, or some combination) 
because, as noted above, the costs introduced by SP (and SD)—namely a 
reduction in information about the estate and other valuable opportunities 
that may arise from asserted rights—are of a kind that the Bankruptcy Code 
and the courts are not equipped to deal with. The errors introduced by ED, 
on the other hand, are mitigated by the core provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the core expertise of the bankruptcy court. As a result, the costs 
of an all-ED rule are much lower than the costs of an all-SP or all-SD rule. 
SP and excessive SD can lead to inefficient outcomes in a large subset of 
cases, whereas ED merely requires the court to entertain self-interested 
arguments that run against the interest of the estate. 
Again, assessing the merits of such arguments is one of the core 
functions of a bankruptcy court. Indeed, modern bankruptcy procedure is 
modeled on our civil adversary system and assumes the constant flow of 
information (good and bad) to the judge.113 Judges are well equipped to deal 
with overzealous parties and we should expect courts to deny motions and 
objections that destroy value. That likelihood of denial provides at least an 
imperfect deterrent against such motions and objections.114 Because the 
party knows that a court will deny a motion that destroys total value, it will 
account for the destruction of value to others when deciding whether to 
bring the motion. This effectively causes the party to internalize the value 
destruction. Moreover, ED that include the cost of litigation provide further 
incentives against motions and objections that parties expect the court to 
deny. 
We cannot reach a parallel conclusion about value-creating motions or 
objections or financing arrangements that are never raised. If a party is 
forced to be silent and no one asserts a position, the adversary system does 
not do a good job of identifying and correcting that efficiency loss. An 
 
 113 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 106, at 35 (arguing that reorganization plans are unfair if they keep 
“bankruptcy judge[s] in the dark”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: 
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 981 (2004) (discussing the 
similarities of modern bankruptcy procedure and civil procedure). 
 114 An increased likelihood of denial reduces the possible return a party realizes from bringing a 
motion. If the party knows with certainty that a motion will be denied, the only value that can be 
realized from bringing the motion is from the possibility of getting a nuisance settlement (payment by 
the other party to avoid litigation costs). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
290 
efficient DIP financing arrangement that is never proposed cannot be 
created by the court, but an inefficient DIP financing arrangement that is 
proposed can be rejected by the court. The same is true of plan support or 
opposition. The asymmetry in how a judge deals with a bad objection (or 
assertion of a right) and a bad non-objection (or non-assertion of a right) 
creates the difference in kind between the costs of ED and the costs of SP 
that forms the foundation for our proposed framework. 
It is worth pausing here to contrast our proposal to the 2014 proposal 
from the ABI reform commission.115 As part of a global proposal for 
reforming Chapter 11, the ABI commission specifically considered the 
impact of agreements that prevent junior creditors from providing DIP 
financing116 and the impact of agreements that provide for the assignment 
of junior creditor voting rights.117 In both instances, the commission 
concluded that these specific provisions could negatively affect the value of 
the estate and should, therefore, be unenforceable. 
The first thing to note is that because the ABI commission proposal 
considers only DIP-financing and voting-rights provisions in intercreditor 
agreements, it does not cover the many other types of provisions that could 
create potential inefficiencies. The proposal is, in this sense, 
underinclusive. 
With the two provisions the proposal does address, the commission’s 
proposal is far too blunt. It would completely deny enforcement of DIP-
financing and voting-rights assignment provisions even if there were no 
externalities present. Our model suggests that the provisions should be 
enforced in this context. And even where externalities are present, the 
model suggests that intercreditor agreements can often be enforced under 
an ED regime in a manner that increases rather than decreases the value of 
the estate. 
C. Forum and Venue 
In the discussion so far, we have focused on the questions of when and 
to what extent intercreditor agreements should be enforced. In an 
increasing number of recent cases, courts have faced an additional issue. If 
one party seeks to pursue its rights in bankruptcy and the other argues for a 
nonbankruptcy forum, which court should make the determination? Our 
model provides guidance here as well. 
 
 115 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 110. 
 116 Id. at 79. 
 117 Id. at 261. 
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There are two relevant groups of cases: (1) cases where the plaintiff 
only asks for ED; and (2) cases where the plaintiff asks for SP or SD. 
1. ED-Only Contracts 
There is no theoretical reason to think that a bankruptcy court has any 
special knowledge in determining ED or that ED must be determined 
before a plan is confirmed. 
Rather, our analysis simply suggests that ED works better when a 
court gets the calculation right. In the absence of evidence that bankruptcy 
courts are better at measuring damages, there is no reason to favor a 
bankruptcy court over any other court and we should defer to the parties’ 
contractual choices about forum.118 
The takeaway, then, is that for ED only cases, courts should enforce 
forum selection clauses as written. If the contract does not contain a forum 
selection clause, courts should turn to the default rule that the plaintiff 
chooses the forum.119 There is really no bankruptcy reason to ignore these 
defaults and drag the case into the bankruptcy court. 
In doctrinal language: If the promisee seeks ED, the parties’ 
intercreditor agreement dispute is not “core” because the key issues are 
sufficiently independent of the issues in the reorganization.120 The 
intercreditor agreement does not affect the total claims on the estate. It only 
affects the ex post redistribution of payouts among subgroups of creditors. 
The bankruptcy court can ignore the intercreditor agreement, award 
payments to the group of creditors as if the intercreditor agreement did not 
exist, and allow them to litigate the distribution later.121 
One might argue that the intercreditor agreement claims are non-core 
claims that are nonetheless related to the bankruptcy and should be brought 
into the proceedings.122 But that position has no strong logic behind it. As a 
starting point, non-core claims cannot be resolved with finality by the 
 
 118 This is consistent with the general treatment of forum selection provisions in non-bankruptcy 
contexts. See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) 
(noting that when a forum-selection clause is valid, “a district court should ordinarily transfer the case 
to the forum specified in that clause”). 
 119 See id. at 574 (noting the default rule that the plaintiff selects the forum and the parties’ ability 
to contract out of that default rule). 
 120 See, e.g., In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 66–68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that 
the court could not rule on objections to confirmation because the intercreditor dispute is not core under 
28 U.S.C. § 157). 
 121 See Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1155, 1218–23 (2014). 
 122 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012) (“[T]he district courts shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 
11.”). 
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bankruptcy court.123 So the bankruptcy court’s power to coordinate is weak. 
And more importantly, these ED claims are state law claims between 
nondebtors with little impact on the claims against the estate. The only 
issue is the amount of damages and that has nothing to do with the size of 
the estate. All of these factors weigh in favor of honoring the forum 
selection clause if a side agreement includes one, and permitting the 
plaintiff to choose the forum if it does not.124 
2. SP and SD Cases 
Considerations are much different for SP and SD cases. Our model 
shows that in many cases, the enforcement of SP (or SD) will impose direct 
externalities on the bankruptcy estate. The promisor may fail to assert 
rights whose benefits run to other creditors. Bankruptcy is a collective 
process that assumes that parties rely on the arguments and actions of other 
parties. Its very premise is to prevent behavior that will benefit some 
stakeholders at the expense of the collective estate. 
Our model therefore has suggested that courts should refrain from 
enforcing SP and SD when there is a chance of externalities. Those 
externalities are directly related to the reorganization because an inefficient 
plan of reorganization or sale might be chosen if the promisor is silenced. 
For example, as we have shown, when J is specifically prohibited from 
objecting, C may be adversely affected because the value of the estate will 
be reduced.125 
A bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization process has a 
unique expertise in determining whether SP (or SD) of a particular 
agreement will have externalities within that reorganization. This particular 
bankruptcy court should therefore decide the initial question of whether 
there are potential externalities. Once the court has undertaken to make that 
initial determination, it should continue with the case. 
In doctrinal terms, any time that a plaintiff in one of these cases seeks 
to get SP (or SD), the case becomes core because it is integrally linked to 
the reorganization. This easily fits within both the statutory definition of 
core under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and under the constitutional definition in the 
Stern v. Marshall line of cases.126 
 
 123 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 471 (2011) (discussing how bankruptcy courts may enter 
final judgments in core proceedings, but in non-core proceedings, the bankruptcy courts submit 
proposed findings to the district court for review and final judgment). 
 124 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum 
should rarely be disturbed.”). 
 125 See supra Section II.B.2. 
 126 564 U.S. 462. For bankruptcy courts to have adjudicatory power over a dispute, the dispute 
must be fall under the statutory definition of “core” set out in 28 U.S.C. § 157 and it must also meet the 
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This approach does allow the plaintiff (S in our model) some freedom 
to choose which court has power over the case. If S never asks for SP (or 
SD), then the case never becomes core. This is consistent with the general 
pattern in U.S. litigation of allowing the plaintiff as master of the complaint 
to craft a case consistent with its desired forum.127 
IV. APPLYING OUR THEORY TO CASES 
In Part II, we described how bankruptcy courts have handled 
intercreditor agreement issues in the most important recent cases. Having 
developed our model and its implications, we now revisit the cases and 
explain how they would be resolved under our approach. In addition to the 
cases discussed earlier, this Part analyzes the In re Extended Stay, Inc. 
(Extended Stay) bankruptcy, which raises particularly subtle intercreditor 
agreement issues. 
A. Boston Generating 
The Boston Generating128 bankruptcy involved an intercreditor 
agreement that set the priority of the parties to the agreement. It also 
included provisions preventing the second-lien creditors from bringing any 
objections or asserting certain rights. During the case these provisions 
raised the question of whether the second-lien creditors had standing to 
object to a sale. Despite terms providing that the second-lien creditors had 
no rights other than holding the lien, voting on a plan, and asserting the 
interests of unsecured creditors, the court allowed them standing to object 
to bid procedures.129 
To get there, the court introduced and applied the “beyond 
peradventure” standard.130 The court appeared to say that provisions of an 
intercreditor agreement that limit the ability of a party to assert bankruptcy 
rights should be held to a higher standard of interpretation and enforced 
 
constitutional definition of “core” laid out in Stern. Thus the court in Stern held that a bankruptcy court 
could not adjudicate a tort counter claim because it was statutorily core but not constitutionally core. Id. 
at 502–03. 
 127 Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) 
(“Because plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most advantageous 
(consistent with jurisdictional and venue limitations), we have termed their selection the ‘plaintiff’s 
venue privilege.’” (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)). 
 128 Interim Order (I) Authorizing Debtors to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant To 11 U.S.C. § 363; 
(II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362 and 
363; and (III) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(B), In re Boston 
Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 10-14419). 
 129 See Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 319. 
 130 Id. 
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only if they lack any ambiguity. This is a strange mode of contract 
interpretation and suggests the courts may be playing fast and loose with 
the canons of contract law to get to a pragmatically desirable outcome.131 It 
also suggests that courts that adhere to the same approach will find 
themselves in a tough spot when the parties have drafted an ironclad 
agreement that nonetheless destroys value. 
To be sure, the primary outcome in Boston Generating—denying 
specific enforcement of the agreement—is exactly what our proposal calls 
for, provided that the objection could impose externalities on nonparties to 
the agreement.132 The posture of the case was such that the externalities 
were potentially high, and the court would not have known the exact level 
until after it considered the objection. The sale, if it was not optimal, could 
have drained value from the remaining unsecured creditors (an externality). 
And until the court heard the objection from the second-lien creditors, it 
would not have known whether the sale was optimal or not. And if there 
had not been an organized and powerful creditor group to bring the 
objection, then the issue would have gone unreviewed. The potential 
externality from leaving important issues unreviewed is the precise 
problem that requires the denial of SP. 
The path by which the court got to that outcome, however, is 
problematic. The “beyond peradventure” standard makes it less likely that a 
promisor would be required to pay damages when a side agreement is 
breached. To be sure, the damages in Boston Generating would have been 
small. The objection that the second-lien creditors brought was ultimately 
denied, and the sale went through.133 The damages running to the first-lien 
creditors should, therefore, have been no more than the costs of responding 
to the objection. But if the objection had succeeded and value for the firsts 
had been lost, the damages might have been more significant. 
Generally, the “beyond peradventure” standard invites promisors to 
opportunistically breach intercreditor agreements that involve some 
ambiguity. Imagine that the second-lien creditors’ objection could have 
 
 131 This is consistent with a common observation that bankruptcy courts often take some doctrinal 
license when working toward the right pragmatic outcome. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. 
Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
24 (2013) (explaining that “judges are tempted to overlook the niceties of corporate form”). 
 132 A court might reasonably decide that the other creditors are so far out of the money that the 
outcome of the hearing would only affect the payoffs of the first- and second-lien creditors. SP would 
be justifiable under those circumstances. 
 133 Boston Generating, 440 B.R. at 320–21 (acknowledging that “this is a somewhat hollow victory 
for the Second Lien Lenders, inasmuch as I have determined, after giving full consideration to the 
arguments and evidence presented by the Second Lien Agent and the objecting Second Lien Lenders, to 
approve the Sale Transaction”). 
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disrupted things just enough to stop the sale, and the first-lien creditors 
would have borne a large loss as a result. If the second-lien creditors do not 
bear any costs for that disruption, then they may bring the objection even 
when it destroys estate value. The only way to correct this is through ED, 
which causes them to bear the costs of the failed sale (and to balance them 
against the benefits of bringing the objection). But those damages are not 
awarded under the “beyond peradventure” standard that the court used. 
Another potential unintended consequence of the “beyond 
peradventure” approach is that parties will skew the substance of future 
agreements so as to delineate the promisee’s rights more broadly. This may 
lead to promisors waiving more bankruptcy rights and create greater 
negative externalities. One common ambiguity in intercreditor agreements 
comes from promisors waiving only the rights that accrue to secured 
creditors while preserving their rights to object as unsecured creditors.134 If 
second-lien creditors waive these additional rights, the waiver may become 
“clear beyond peradventure,” but it will also become much broader and 
actions that have the potential to benefit unsecured creditors will become 
less likely. 
Boston Generating highlights the risks of both SP on one hand and a 
“beyond peradventure” standard (in which damages are not available) on 
the other hand. Our proposal suggests that it is better to alter the contractual 
remedies for breach (from SP or SD to ED) rather than the interpretive 
standard for determining breach. Enforcing broad contracts but not narrow 
contracts is over and underinclusive in perverse ways. Broad contracts that 
prohibit all defection will be specifically enforced without regard to the 
harm to the estate while narrow provisions that are targeted at specific 
holdout behavior will be unenforceable even for damages. An alternative 
approach—faithfully interpreting the language of the contract but only 
allowing for ED—ensures that the parties to the side agreement can tailor 
the agreement to prevent holdout behavior when it is most likely to occur 
without prohibiting other potentially beneficial defection behavior. If courts 
focus on the remedy, they can limit negative externalities of side 
agreements without interfering with this tailoring ability. 
B. Momentive 
Momentive was ultimately a damages case. Though the intercreditor 
agreement specifically gave the senior lien creditors the option to ask for a 
 
 134 A junior secured lender will usually be both a secured creditor and an unsecured creditor 
because the value of its collateral will be less than the full amount of its claim, leaving the junior 
creditor with a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the deficiency. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (bifurcating claims of undersecured creditors). 
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SP remedy, senior lien creditors did not press arguments to enjoin the 
junior lien creditors from asserting their rights. Such a move would have 
been problematic, due to the dynamics of the Chapter 11 reorganization 
process. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to propose a resolution 
of the bankruptcy.135 In that process, the debtor can choose the particulars 
of the plan. In practice, this is achieved through complicated negotiations 
with various stakeholders, which result in a plan that favors some and 
disfavors others. The Bankruptcy Code then provides baseline protections 
such as absolute priority and the best interests test to ensure that alliances 
do not overly favor or disfavor certain groups of creditors.136 There is still, 
however, a wide range of discretion in which the debtor may operate. Lots 
of deals to defect and other agreements are negotiated to ensure the debtor 
has the necessary support for a plan. Within the limits of the absolute 
priority rule and the best interests test, value moves from one group of 
stakeholders to another in an attempt to lock in a feasible plan that creates 
value for the estate as a whole. In Momentive, these deals took the form, as 
they increasingly do in large bankruptcies, of a restructuring support 
agreement (RSA).137 The RSA locked in the defection and provided the 
details of the plan that would result.138 
If the senior lien holders in Momentive had forced the junior lien 
holders to vote against a plan, the court might have lost information about 
the value of the estate and the claims.139 As noted above, only when parties 
assert their interests by voting and arguing in favor of a plan does the court 
receive information about: (1) whether the proposed plan complies with 
Bankruptcy Code requirements, such as the absolute priority rule and the 
best interests test; (2) whether the plan provides value to the estate; and (3) 
whether the deals to defect are problematic. Imagine a reorganization with 
three classes of creditors where side agreements silence the class in the 
middle. Now imagine there are two possible plans that could be confirmed. 
The best plan maximizes value and benefits the junior two classes. The 
other plan shifts value from the middle class to the senior creditors and 
 
 135 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012) (giving the debtor an exclusive right to propose a plan initially); 
id. § 1121(d) (authorizing court to extend the debtor’s exclusivity period). 
 136 The absolute priority rule prohibits confirmation of a reorganization plan that would give any 
recovery to a lower priority class unless the objecting class is paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) 
(2012). The best interests test requires that each creditor or equity holder be given at least as much as it 
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012). 
 137 Baird, supra note 106, at 19. 
 138 See Declaration of William H. Carter, Chief Financial Officer of Momentive Performance 
Materials Inc., In Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Pleadings at 66, In re MPM Silicones, 
LLC, 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-22503). 
 139 This might include information about the risk of the business, the value of its assets, or the cost 
and availability of alternative capital sources. 
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leaves the third class completely out of the money. Without hearing from 
the middle class, the court is faced simply with a two-party disagreement 
about the value of the two plans. Now imagine, quite realistically, that the 
third class is a fractured and dispersed group of unsecured creditors. If we 
let the middle class vote and assert their interest, we are likely to get a plan 
that maximizes the estate and benefits the two junior classes.140 Much 
information can thus be gained by allowing the middle class to assert its 
interest and express its independent view of the options. 
As noted above, the junior lien holders in Momentive were allowed to 
assert their interests. In that sense, the outcome of the case is consistent 
with our model. The standard was a rough doctrinal tool to get a pragmatic 
outcome. Yet, the court—applying the “beyond peradventure” standard—
found no breach of the agreement and therefore awarded no damages for 
the senior lien creditors. Applying the “beyond peradventure” standard to 
damages cases in that way is not consistent with our model. This 
application introduces unnecessary costs on independent contracting, and 
thus makes it harder to design an agreement that is targeted at preventing 
holdout behavior. 
Once SP was off the table and the junior lien creditors were allowed to 
assert their interests, there was no longer a bankruptcy purpose to justify 
not awarding damages on the contract. Instead, the court simply failed to 
enforce an intercreditor agreement and reduced the ability of the 
nondebtors to privately order their respective payments from the 
bankruptcy estate. Our model suggests instead that Momentive should have 
been an ED case—and one that never belonged in the bankruptcy court in 
the first place.141 
C. RadioShack 
As noted earlier, the disputes in RadioShack were quite complicated.142 
Standard General wanted to credit bid the amounts owed to it under the 
ABL.143 Salus was trying to assert the rights of the SCP lender group under 
an intercreditor agreement to stop Standard General from doing that.144 
 
 140 See generally David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992) (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code is designed to 
focus voting authority on the affected class or classes). 
 141 We discuss the appropriate damages calculation in Part V, infra. 
 142 See supra Section I.C. 
 143 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 38,; Borders et al., supra note 16, at 2. On the 
definition of credit bidding, see, e.g., In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 320 (3d Cir. 
2010) (defining credits bid as “allow[ing] a secured lender to bid the debt owed it in lieu of other 
currency at a sale of its collateral”). 
 144 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 16, at 23, 29–30, 34, 63. 
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Cerberus was trying to assert its rights under an AAL to prohibit Salus 
from asserting its rights to block the credit bid.145 Finally, the first-out 
lenders of the ABL were trying to assert their rights under an AAL to stop 
Standard General from moving forward with the sale and credit bid.146 
In the end, the court formally held that Cerberus could stop Salus from 
asserting its rights.147 At the same time, the first-out lenders were pressured 
by the court to settle and give up their objections to the sale.148 As a result, 
the sale went forward.149 
From a realist perspective of the whole case, the court was fully aware 
of (and likely considered) all the various parties’ reasoning and arguments 
and let the sale go forward. The realist might view the court’s actions as 
refusing to allow anyone to assert rights that would prohibit the sale. The 
court, then, heard all the arguments, decided the sale was the appropriate 
outcome, and ruled on the various agreements in a way that allowed the 
sale to go through. In that sense, the denial of Salus’s ability to object did 
not deprive the court of the necessary information to rule on the sale. 
From a more formalistic viewpoint, it declined to specifically enforce 
the first-out lenders’ asserted right to prohibit Standard General from 
bidding. It then specifically enforced Cerberus’s right to stop Salus from 
specifically enforcing its right to prohibit the bidding. 
Our model suggests that the court got to the right outcome but that the 
formalistic path was not quite right. Salus’s attempt to stop the sale under 
the intercreditor agreement was fraught with the risk of imposing 
externalities on the estate (the unsecured creditors in particular). The court 
should have denied Salus the right to invoke the intercreditor agreement 
outright, rather than denying it indirectly by granting Cerberus’s SP 
request. Finally, damages suits should have been the remedy allowed for 
each of the various parties. 
D. Extended Stay 
The Extended Stay bankruptcy involved two separate disputes that 
implicate our model.150 
The Extended Stay hotel chain had been acquired by an investor 
consortium led by David Lichtenstein in 2007.151 The funds were raised 
 
 145 Id. at 63. 
 146 Id. at 67. 
 147 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 75, at 64–65. 
 148 See id. at 65–67. 
 149 See id. at 60–67. 
 150 See In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, 435 B.R. 139 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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through a mortgage loan and ten layers of mezzanine loans.152 The 
mortgage loan was sold to a trust and certificates in the trust were then sold 
off into eighteen different priority classes.153 Some of the mezzanine loans 
were also securitized and interests in them were resold.154 The result was a 
constellation of dozens of creditor classes who were vying for power when 
the chain filed for bankruptcy in 2009.155 
The first dispute that concerns us was among the holders of the trust 
certificates for the mortgage loan. The trust agreements provided for a 
Servicer and Special Servicer who would be the sole representatives of the 
certificate holders.156 The certificate holders agreed that they would have no 
individual rights to institute any action or proceeding in bankruptcy.157 
They also agreed that no certificate holder could take any action that would 
prejudice the rights of any other certificate holder.158 
Based on these agreements, Five Mile Capital, one of the certificate 
holders, brought an action against other junior certificate holders to enjoin 
them from engaging in any negotiations and agreements with a debtor.159 
Consistent with our venue analysis, which characterizes an attempt to 
specifically enforce a side agreement as core, the bankruptcy court held 
that an attempt to enjoin negotiations with a debtor was plainly core and 
affected the bankruptcy proceedings.160 
This dispute falls at the heart of our model. Five Mile Capital’s 
attempt to prevent any negotiation of deals to defect was likely to create 
externalities that could reduce the overall value of the estate. The 
appropriate remedy for the breach of the trust agreements under our 
analysis is to deny the injunction and allow an action for damages. 
The second dispute related to a “bad boy” guarantee agreement. Bad 
boy guarantees are terms by which a borrower and its guarantors agree to 
be liable to lenders for certain “bad acts.”161 The bad acts often include the 
 
 151 Id. at 54. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 56. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 57. 
 160 Id. This ruling was affirmed on appeal by the district court. Extended Stay, 435 B.R. at 146 
(“Five Mile’s efforts to prevent the Debtors from pursuing ongoing post-filing negotiations in their 
reorganization proceeding clearly implicate the core bankruptcy function of estate administration, 
particularly plan formulation.”). 
 161 See Djaha et al., supra note 21. 
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filing of bankruptcy. The effect is a provision that converts a non-recourse 
mortgage into a loan with recourse against the debtor and its principals 
when a debtor files for bankruptcy. In Extended Stay, Lichtenstein and his 
equity fund had personally guaranteed the mezzanine debt up to $100 
million in the event that the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition.162 The 
bankruptcy court held that these claims were neither core nor related to the 
bankruptcy and found that it did not have jurisdiction over them.163 Our 
model suggests this was the wrong decision. 
These guarantees may not appear on their face to be intercreditor 
agreements of the type we have been considering. Instead, they are 
agreements between the debtor and its principals on one side and a creditor 
on the other. But the liability of the principals can have the exact same 
effect as the intercreditor agreements in our model. If a principal is required 
by the guarantee to take or not take certain actions, this can change the 
decisionmaking process in bankruptcy. Just as a creditor may be forced to 
refrain from negotiations or from voting on a plan, a controlling 
shareholder may be forced to refrain from filing a bankruptcy and 
proposing a plan. This can prevent deals to defect between other creditors 
and the controlling shareholder. 
For example, a net positive value bankruptcy filing may benefit the 
estate as a whole but be prohibited under a bad boy guarantee. If the 
creditor chooses to enforce that guarantee specifically or by SD, the estate 
will be worse off. And, it turns out, these agreements in operation often 
have the flavor of excessive SD. 
This was true in Extended Stay. Bank of America argued that its claim 
had nothing to do with the bankruptcy estate because the money came out 
of the equity holders’ pockets, not the estate. The agreements even 
prohibited any indemnification claims from guarantors against the estate.164 
But, if enforced, the agreements—which required payment of up to $100 
million—functioned as a SD provision that would discourage the filing of a 
bankruptcy even when that filing was value-enhancing for the estate. 
To see why, compare the payouts to Bank of America outside 
bankruptcy to those in bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, Bank of America 
had a non-recourse claim on the collateral. Inside bankruptcy, Bank of 
America had that same claim. Thus, the expected damages for the bad 
act—filing for bankruptcy—would be the difference in the value of that 
 
 162 See Extended Stay, 418 B.R. at 54. 
 163 Id. at 57–59. On appeal, the district court agreed that the matters were not core but found that 
they were related to the bankruptcy. Extended Stay, 435 B.R. at 150. It nonetheless affirmed the holding 
because it found that abstention of jurisdiction was appropriate in that case. Id. 
 164 Extended Stay, 418 B.R. at 58. 
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recourse claim in bankruptcy and the value of the same claim out of 
bankruptcy.165 But the guarantee provides damages equal to the total 
deficiency claim (the difference between the total debt and the value of the 
recourse claim). The guarantee value, then, can greatly exceed the ED.166 
This transforms the guarantee into a SD clause that imposes the exact 
externalities we discuss in our model. These claims are therefore core to the 
bankruptcy proceeding,167 and if the externalities do exist, only ED should 
be allowed and awarded. 
V. CALCULATING EXPECTATION DAMAGES 
Now that we have discussed the leading cases, we can address with 
examples a concern that our proposal might raise—namely that a court 
might not calculate ED properly. If the parties do not have faith in the 
courts to calculate the damages for breaches of intercreditor agreements, 
the superiority of ED over the side agreement parties’ choice of remedies is 
not guaranteed.168 Damage awards that are too high have the same effects as 
SD. Damage awards that are too low may have no useful impact and 
encourage too many breaches. In those cases, ED will be flawed. 
This problem is not unique to intercreditor agreements. Rather, the 
inability to calculate accurate damages is common to all areas of contract 
law.169 But there are at least three reasons to think that the scope of the 
problem will be limited in relation to intercreditor agreements. 
First, courts calculate complicated damages claims all the time. 
Indeed, every large bankruptcy is really one large series of claim and asset 
 
 165 The difference might arise from the Bankruptcy Code’s suspension of rights that the creditor 
might exercise or be based on economic effects from the filing. Unsecured creditors are not entitled to 
interest or opportunity cost payments during the bankruptcy case. 
 166 For example, a creditor may have a lien of 100 on an asset worth 50. Assume the debtor has no 
other assets. Outside bankruptcy, that claim is worth 50 (assuming no cost of foreclosure). Inside 
bankruptcy, that claim might be worth 45 (assuming 5 in process costs of bankruptcy). The ED are 5. A 
bad boy guarantee provides recourse against the principal for any shortfall below 100. Assuming the 
guarantor is solvent, the bankruptcy filing provides recovery of 100. 
 167 If damages were set high enough, the bad boy guarantee could become the equivalent of an 
absolute agreement that prevents a party from filing bankruptcy altogether. Such an agreement goes to 
the very heart of bankruptcy and is generally not enforceable. See, e.g., In re Intervention Energy 
Holdings, LLC, 553 B.R. 258, 263 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (“It is a well settled principle that an advance 
agreement to waive the benefits conferred by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public 
policy.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Again our framework suggests that such a 
policy is wise as it applies to SP and SD but not as it applies to ED. 
 168 See Example 3 in the Appendix, which shows that ED can be inferior to the parties’ choice of 
SP when externalities are low. 
 169 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1208 (5th Cir. 1986) (“If too 
few facts exist to permit the trier of fact to calculate proper damages, then a reasonable remedy in law is 
unavailable.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
302 
valuations. Courts will not be perfect at valuing the damages for these 
claims, but they should be relatively good at it. Nevertheless, damages 
could be too speculative to calculate. 
This is a practical and a doctrinal problem. Courts generally will not 
award damages when the claims are unduly speculative. This rule varies by 
jurisdiction, but the general rule is that the parties have to be able to show 
the presence of damages with some certainty.170 Notably, this doctrine does 
not require absolute certainty and allows for sophisticated financial 
evidence to provide a reasonable estimate of the losses caused by a 
breach.171 
That said, courts are more skeptical of some types of claims than 
others. For instance, lost-profits claims tend to garner the closest scrutiny 
under the uncertainty doctrine.172 That suggests that our proposal will face 
the largest obstacle when damages claims are brought based on the 
speculative future business performance under counterfactual plans of 
reorganization that might have been confirmed but for the breach of the 
side agreement. But damages based on the value of actual differences in 
asset distributions, in concrete financing proposals, in interest rates, in costs 
of procedures, and in the price paid for assets should fit easily within the 
courts’ traditional valuation toolkit. If the party seeking damages can show 
the likelihood that the breach foreclosed a concrete alternative, the court 
will be able to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the damages associated 
with that breach. 
Most damages claims for breach of a side agreement will meet this 
standard. For example, the primary claims in Momentive were that the 
junior creditor breached the side agreement by (1) supporting a plan with a 
low cramdown interest rate for the senior creditor; (2) supporting a plan 
that did not provide make-whole payments to the senior creditors; (3) 
opposing the senior creditors’ request for adequate protection payments; (4) 
receiving distributions that violated the priority set forth in the agreement; 
and (5) supporting DIP financing that provided the new lender with 
priming liens on the senior creditors’ collateral. 
The damages on the first and second claims would be easy to 
calculate. The interest rate differential and the make-whole differential are 
set, so finding those numbers requires simple subtraction. The only open 
 
 170 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 171 See Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1010–11 (N.Y. 1993); Tanner v. Exxon 
Corp., No. 79C–JA–5, 1981 WL 191389, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 23, 1981); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352; 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD., A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:8 (4th ed. 2002).  
 172 See Example 3 in the Appendix. 
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question is whether or not the plan would have been approved but for the 
support of the breaching party. That is a mechanical application of 
Bankruptcy Code’s voting requirements for cramdown. 
Damages for the third claim turn on the amount of the adequate 
protection payments and the likelihood that they would have been granted 
in the absence of the opposition by the breaching creditors. The only 
speculation required to calculate those damages is speculation on the 
outcomes of judicial process, a topic on which judges have sufficient 
expertise. The damages on the fourth claim are straightforward, as courts 
regularly resolve priority and subordination questions. The fifth claim 
poses perhaps the most uncertainty. To prove damages, the senior creditors 
would have to show a concrete alternative financing proposal that would 
have been adopted if the breaching creditors had not supported the one they 
did. Once that showing is made, calculating damages is just a matter of 
comparing the protections the senior creditors would receive under two 
proposals. 
The RadioShack and Boston Generating cases dealt with objections to 
bankruptcy sales. In Boston Generating, the damages would have been 
merely the litigation costs. The breaching party brought its objection to the 
sale, the objection was denied, and the sale went through. Had the sale been 
blocked, the court would have had to compare the actual outcome with the 
terms of the proposed sale. That is not a speculative calculation. In 
RadioShack, the parties on both sides of the sale objections invoked side 
agreements. Salus and the first-out lenders wanted to invoke side 
agreements to block the sale, and Cerberus wanted to invoke a side 
agreement to push the sale through (to block objections to the sale). 
Cerberus’s damages claims would be no different than the damages claims 
in Boston Generating. If the sale was blocked, the court would just need to 
compare the sale that was blocked with the actual outcome. 
Salus’s damage claim, on the other hand, might have been deemed 
unduly speculative. There was little evidence that any alternative buyers 
were actually available to buy the assets. Nothing was known about 
competing prices or terms. Any claim based on a breach that leads to a sale 
is speculative if the alternative to a sale was simply waiting and hoping for 
a better deal to come along. That suggests that without concrete evidence of 
an alternative, the damages for a breach that leads to a sale will be zero (or 
at least no more than the cost of litigating the issue). 
Five Mile Capital’s claims in Extended Stay would be, perhaps, the 
most speculative. The allegation was that the breaching party was 
negotiating with the debtor “over the contours of a potential plan of 
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reorganization” in violation of the side agreement.173 Measuring the 
damages in that situation requires a prediction of what the “contours” of a 
confirmable plan would have looked like in the absence of the negotiation. 
Without deeper information about the specific provisions at issue,174 that is 
a difficult counterfactual to prove. Thus, we recognize that in a small 
population of cases ED might undercompensate because they are 
speculative. But the realm of cases where damages are truly speculative is 
small enough to give us confidence that ED are preferable as a general 
rule.175 
Second, the relevant comparison in measuring how well damages are 
calculated is between the courts’ accuracy in setting damages ex post and 
the accuracy of the parties in estimating damages ex ante. For expectation 
damages to function as we describe in our model, they only need to be as 
good as or better than the ex ante estimates that parties use when writing 
these agreements. There is good reason to think the courts will be more 
accurate: A court adjudicating these claims after the fact has more 
information about the damages claim than the parties have when setting SD 
or providing for SP long before distress arises. The court also has the 
benefit of expert testimony and could even bring in unbiased court-
appointed experts. 
The ex post nature of the damages inquiry also gives the court the time 
for reflection and gathering of evidence. In deciding a SP question that 
determines whether a court will allow objections to a sale or a confirmation 
hearing, the court is under considerable time pressure. Parties often argue 
that a quick sale is imperative to avoid the classic “melting ice cube” 
problem of bankruptcy. In those contexts, decisions on SP, and general 
decisions about whether certain debtor actions are acceptable, have to be 
made with limited information. An intercreditor damages claim, on the 
other hand, need not be decided on such a short time frame. If a junior 
 
 173 In re Extended Stay Inc., 435 B.R. 139, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 174 Because the case was injunctive in nature, Five Mile Capital was attempting to prevent all 
potential negotiations and thus framed its legal argument broadly. Had the case been in a damages 
stage, Five Mile Capital likely would have pointed to concrete provisions that harmed it, and that 
evidence might have demonstrated damages more specifically. 
 175 Many of the damages calculations we have discussed deal with bankruptcy-specific processes. 
That might lead some to disagree with our earlier conclusions on forum and venue and call for these 
disputes to be litigated exclusively before a bankruptcy court. But none of these processes are 
conceptually inaccessible to a generalist judge who is experienced in hearing evidence on and 
measuring damages in all sorts of fields. And the ability of bankruptcy experts to testify as to the costs 
of these processes makes the damages calculation here no different than the calculations in the medical 
malpractice, environmental, or financial cases that courts routinely adjudicate. Additionally, the parties 
always have the ability to include forum selection or arbitration clauses that require the cases to be 
heard by someone with expertise. 
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creditor wants to support an emergency bankruptcy sale in violation of an 
intercreditor agreement, the court can allow the sale to go through under 
standard bankruptcy principles and then adjudicate later whether the junior 
creditor’s support harmed the senior creditor. Evidence that comes to light 
after the sale (such as proof that another firm bidder would have come to 
light if the sale had been delayed) cannot be used to undo the sale, but it 
can be used to support a damages claim under the intercreditor agreement. 
Third, the problem only exists if the expected value of a claim is 
skewed in one direction. If courts are imprecise in an unbiased manner, the 
model still holds.176 When considering whether to breach a side agreement 
and valuing the potential damages for that breach, the parties will compare 
the benefit of breaching against the expected value of the damages claim. If 
errors are unbiased, that expected value does not change. Of course, if there 
are some claims where the courts are known to systematically err in one 
direction, the framework could be modified to allow for SP where we 
expect courts to get things systematically wrong. The judicially mandated 
interest rates used in cramdown177—which do not match actual market 
rates—might be an example of this sort of systematic bias. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we analyzed intercreditor and other side agreements, 
and what bankruptcy law should do about them. The courts’ current 
approaches to the topic vary. They recognize potential problems with fully 
enforcing these agreements, but their response to that recognition tends to 
be a decision to read the contract language narrowly so as to preserve the 
rights the Bankruptcy Code provides. This approach, as we show, may 
cause parties to simply draft these side agreements using broader language, 
thus exacerbating the underlying problem. We argue that a more systematic 
approach that addresses remedies is warranted. 
We model the costs and benefits of enforcing side agreements and 
show that side agreements can create externalities that bankruptcy law is 
justified in limiting. We propose that side agreements should be 
enforceable but only for damages and not specific performance. The 
equitable remedy of specific performance for a breach of a side agreement 
should be replaced with expectation damages if there is a potential for 
 
 176 See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG., 279, 293 (1986); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 406 (1973); Kenton K. Yee, Control Premiums, 
Minority Discounts, and Optimal Judicial Valuation, 48 J.L. & ECON. 517, 536–37 (2005) (noting the 
irrelevance of unbiased errors for risk neutral litigants). 
 177 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004). 
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value-destroying externalities. Though our proposal is not a panacea for all 
problems that might arise in bankruptcy, on balance, it honors the purpose 
of the side agreement while preserving open space for value-increasing 
actions that can benefit outside stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX 
In this Appendix, we give two additional examples to show that 
parties may choose SP inefficiently and that ED can improve upon SP. But 
ED is not a panacea, and when externalities are low, enforcing the parties’ 
agreed-upon bargain is socially preferred. 
 
Example 3: Undercompensatory ED 
 
Good State (p=.5) Bad State (1-p=.5) 
 
R L R L 
S 130 200 100 250 
J 20 0 20 0 
C 70 0 120 0 
S+J 150 200 120 250 
S+J+C 220 200 240 250 
 
In Example 3, we consider the possibility that courts will 
underestimate expectation damages, which leads the parties to choose SP 
instead. But ED would be efficient notwithstanding its undercompensation 
of the promisee. The undercompensation allows C to capture more of the 
gains from defection, which S+J do not internalize when they strike their 
side deal. 
a. Status quo 
As in Examples 1 and 2, J would choose action R to improve her 
payoff by 20. This is efficient in the good state (it produces a total payoff 
of 220 versus 200) but inefficient in the bad state (a total payoff of 240 
instead of 250). 
b. Side agreement with SP 
If the parties choose SP, J will agree to choose action L, which 
generates a higher payoff for the S+J coalition in both states (200 versus 
150 in the good state and 250 versus 120 in the bad state). The S+J 
coalition will get an expected payoff of 225 under SP. 
c. Side agreement with SD 
In Example 3, action R is costly for S, but it is particularly costly for S 
in the bad state. If the parties choose a SD contract, they have two choices: 
they can try to set damages high enough to prevent action R in the bad 
state, or they can set damages lower in order to elicit action R and a side 
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payment from C in the good state. They cannot do both. If they set 
damages above 90, then J+C would find it too expensive to defect in the 
good state. But if they set damages below 140, J+C would defect and 
choose action R in the bad state. 
In Example 3, the optimal SD contract for the S+J coalition is d = 140 
or higher, which elicits action L in both states. Thus, the optimal SD 
contract is equivalent to a SP contract. If they were to choose d = 90 
instead, action R would be chosen in both states. In the good state, this 
elicits a side payment of 70 from C to J, and in the bad state, C pays 95 to 
J.178 The S+J coalition anticipates these side payments, and thus they expect 
a total payout of 220 in the good state and 215 in the bad state for an 
expected payoff of only 217.5 < 225. 
d. Undercompensatory ED 
Now, let’s assume that courts will attempt to estimate ED upon a 
breach, but they will underestimate the damages by 50%, and all parties are 
aware of the undercompensation. In the good state, S loses 70, so the true 
damages will be estimated at 35. In the bad state, the true damages of 150 
will be estimated at only 75. Given the undercompensatory damages, J will 
choose to defect in both states and choose action R. When C and J bargain, 
C will make a side payment of 42.5 in the good state and 87.5 in the bad 
state to induce action R.179 Thus, the S+J coalition expects 192.5 in the 
good state (direct payoff of 150 plus the 42.5 side payment) and 207.5 in 
the bad state (120 plus 87.5). This produces an expected payoff of 200, 
which is less than their expected payoff from the SP contract (225). Though 
SP is preferred by the S+J coalition, undercompensatory ED produces a 
higher total payoff for all parties. Undercompensatory ED results in action 
R in both states, and the total expected payoff to all parties is 230. The SP 
contract results in action L in both states, which produces a total expected 
payoff of only 225. 
Two points about undercompensatory ED are worth emphasizing. 
First, undercompensatory ED beats the S+J coalition’s SP contract from a 
social perspective because externalities are sufficiently high. To see this, 
suppose C’s payoff from action R falls by 40 in both states (to 30 in the 
good state and 80 in the bad state). Because damages are low, C and J 
would bargain to breach and choose action R in both states, but the social 
 
 178 A side payment of 95 splits the surplus from defection between J and C in the bad state. 
Collectively, J and C gain 50 from defecting (their direct payoff increases by 140, less 90 in damages). 
C gets half of that surplus in bargaining, so it will pay 95 to J and keep 120 – 95 = 25. 
 179 In the good state, C and J would get a surplus equal to the improvement in their payoff from 
choosing action R less the damages they pay to S. This is 90 – 35 = 55. C gets half of that surplus, or 
27.5, so C pays a side payment of 70 – 27.5 = 42.5 to J. The bad state calculation follows similarly. 
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payoff would be inferior to choosing action L in both states. Significant 
externalities are necessary to justify replacing SP with ED. 
Second, undercompensatory ED is not as efficient as fully 
compensatory ED would be. If ED were estimated properly, J would 
breach and choose action R in the good state and L in the bad state. This 
would be the most efficient option, and if it were available, S and J would 
choose it. But because it is not available, they choose a SP contract that is 
inferior socially to the undercompensatory ED that is available. 
e. Takeaways from Example 3 
Example 3 illustrates that parties may rationally avoid ED because 
they do not expect courts to fully estimate the damages from breach. When 
damages are undercompensatory, breach occurs more often than is socially 
efficient. Undercompensatory ED also results in a greater surplus being 
retained by parties outside the side agreement. This causes the side 
contracting parties S+J to steer away from ED and choose an alternative 
(SP) that allows the coalition to keep more of the surplus that is available, 
even though this choice may be socially inferior. When externalities are 
higher, the incentives of parties become more skewed toward SP and away 
from undercompensatory ED. 
 
Example 4: Bargaining with S to enforce the side agreement 
 
Good State (p=.5) Bad State (1−p=.5) 
 
R L R L 
C1 0 50 0 50 
S 210 200 120 200 
J 20 0 20 0 
C2 50 0 50 0 
S+J 230 200 140 200 
C1 +S+J+C2 280 250 190 250 
 
In Example 4, we consider the possibility that the bargaining 
environment may change. In this case we suppose that S is able to strike a 
deal to defect but J is not. What effects will this have on the incentives of 
the S+J coalition with respect to the side agreement they write, and how 
will this impact the efficiency of ED as an alternative? 
To make the case interesting, we introduce two outside parties (C1 
and C2). C1’s interests are more aligned with S than with J, while C2’s 
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interests are more aligned with J. We suppose that C1 has the ability to 
bargain with S, but C2 and J cannot bargain. 
f. Status quo 
The status quo outcome is similar to Examples 1 and 2. J will choose 
action R to improve her payoff by 20. This will be consistent with 
efficiency in the good state (a total payoff of 280 versus 250) but inefficient 
in the bad state (190 versus 250). 
g. Specific performance and stipulated damages 
Notice that in this example, S’s and J’s direct payoffs are aligned in 
the good state: they both prefer action R. This makes the analysis of SP 
contracts different from the earlier examples. If S+J can write a side deal 
that includes SP as a remedy, S will require that J choose action L. This 
will result in J choosing action L in the bad state. In the good state, 
however, S also prefers action R. Thus, S can choose not to enforce the side 
agreement, allowing J to choose action R. Knowing this, C1 will offer a 
side deal to S to induce S to enforce the contract against J.180 
Because C1 strongly prefers action L, C1 will be willing to pay S to 
invoke its right against J. Because C1 and S will split their total surplus of 
250 – 210 = 40 in half, C1 will pay 30 to S to induce S to invoke J’s choice 
of action L.181 This is inefficient in the good state because C2’s payoff is 
not taken into account. 
If S and J chose to write a contract with SD, the outcome would be 
equivalent to the SP outcome. S and J would set damages high enough that 
J will prefer not to breach the contract if S chooses to enforce it. J will 
choose action R in both states, and in the good state, C1 will make the same 
side payment to induce S to enforce the contract against J. 
h. Expectation damages 
Under ED, the outcome differs from the outcome that would occur 
under the S+J coalition’s preferred contract. In Example 4, ED again results 
in a more efficient outcome. In the bad state, J will perform under the 
contract and choose action L. In the good state, J will breach and choose 
action R. J will not need to pay any damages for breach because S’s direct 
payoff also favors action R. This outcome is consistent with efficiency. 
 
 180 Note that this does not require a bargain with J, which we have assumed is not possible here. S 
could simply communicate to J whether it intended to enforce its contract against J or not, and J will act 
accordingly. 
 181 The payment of 30 consists of 10 to compensate S for its lower payout under L (200, vs. 210 
under R), plus one half of the parties’ joint surplus of 40. 
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It is crucial to emphasize, however, that the efficiency consequences 
can be reversed, depending on C2’s payoff. To see this most simply, 
consider Example 4 if C2’s payoff in both states falls from 50 to below 20 
under action R. None of the contracts or outcomes would change, but the 
efficiency consequences would be reversed and the SP contract the parties 
prefer would yield an efficient outcome, while ED would not. 
i. Takeaways from Example 4 
Example 4 highlights another potential source of inefficiency that can 
result from side contracting, but it also illustrates that replacing the parties’ 
choice of remedies with ED is not a panacea for all efficiency problems. 
The inefficiency of the side agreement follows because the parties to the 
side agreement will take into account only themselves and the parties with 
whom they expect to be able to strike bargains. In the earlier examples, we 
showed the virtues of ED, which flow from the ability of J to strike deals to 
defect. But when J cannot bargain, a SP contract (or a SD contract with 
damages high enough to prevent breach) can be preferred.  
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